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Abstract—We consider a setting in which two nodes (referred
to as forwarders) compete to choose a relay node from a set
of relays, as they ephemerally become available (e.g., wake up
from a sleep state). Each relay, when it arrives, offers a (pos-
sibly different) “reward” to each forwarder. Each forwarder’s
objective is to minimize a combination of the delay incurred in
choosing a relay and the reward offered by the chosen relay.
As an example, we develop the reward structure for the specific
problem of geographical forwarding over a network of sleep-
wake cycling relays.
We study two variants of the generic relay selection problem,
namely, the completely observable (CO) case where, when a
relay arrives, both forwarders get to observe both rewards, and
the partially observable (PO) case where each forwarder can
only observe its own reward. Formulating the problem as a two
person stochastic game, we characterize solution in terms of Nash
Equilibrium Policy Pairs (NEPPs). For the CO case we provide
a general structure of the NEPPs. For the PO case we prove that
there exists an NEPP within the class of threshold policy pairs.
We then consider the particular application of geographical
forwarding of packets in a shared network of sleep-wake cycling
wireless relays. For this problem, for a particular reward struc-
ture, using realistic parameter values corresponding to TelosB
wireless mote, we numerically compare the performance (in terms
of cost to both forwarders) of the various NEPPs and draw the
following key insight: even for moderate separation between the
two forwarders, the performance of the various NEPPs is close
to the performance of a simple strategy where each forwarder
behaves as if the other forwarder is not present. We also conduct
simulation experiments to study the end-to-end performance of
the simple forwarding policy.
Index Terms—Competitive relay selection, geographical for-
warding, stochastic games, Bayesian games.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are concerned in this paper with a class of resource
allocation problems in wireless networks, in which compet-
ing nodes need to acquire a resource, such as a physical
radio relay (see the geographical forwarding example later
in Section III) or a channel (as in a cognitive radio network
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[1], [2]), when a sequence of such resources “arrive” over
time, and are available only fleetingly for acquisition. In
this paper, formulating such a problem for two nodes as a
stochastic game, we consider the completely observable and
partially observable cases, and provide characterizations of the
Nash Equilibrium Policy Pairs (NEPP). We provide numerical
results, and insights therefrom, for a specific reward structure
derived from the problem of geographical forwarding in sleep-
wake cycling networks.
The Geographical Forwarding Context: With the increas-
ing importance of “smart” utilization of our limited resources
(e.g., energy and clean water) there is a need for instrumenting
our buildings and campuses with wireless sensor networks.
As awareness grows and sensing technologies emerge, new
applications will be implemented. While each application will
require different sensors and back-end analytics, the availabil-
ity of a common wireless network infrastructure will promote
the quick deployment of new applications. One approach for
building such an infrastructure, say, in a large building setting,
would be to deploy a large number of relay nodes, and
employ the idea of geographical forwarding. If the phenomena
to be monitored are slowly varying over time, the traffic
on the network can be assumed to be light. In addition,
such applications are delay tolerant, thus accommodating the
approach of opportunistic geographical forwarding over sleep-
wake cycling networks [3], [4].
Sleep-wake cycling is an approach whereby, to conserve
the relay battery power, their radios are kept turned OFF,
while coming ON periodically to provide opportunities for
packet forwarding. The problem of forwarding in such a
setting was explored in [3], [4], where the formulation was
limited to a single alarm packet flowing through the network.
Whereas the emphasis in [3] was to develop an end-to-
end optimal forwarding algorithm, thus requiring a global
organization step, in [4], which is our prior work on this
problem, we sought a locally-optimal forwarding heuristic.
End-to-end forwarding was achieved by applying the local
heuristic at each forwarding step. We found that, over certain
range of operation, the performance obtained by the heuristic
is comparable with the optimal solution provided by [3].
In the setting discussed above, even though the traffic is
light, there is still a chance that there is more than one
forwarder seeking a relay from among a set of potential relays.
There then arises the problem of assigning the relays, as they
wake-up, to one or the other of the forwarders. This, thus,
is an extension of the local forwarding problem discussed in
[4]. Formally, the local forwarding problem we consider in
this paper is the following. There are two forwarders each of
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2which has to choose a relay node to forward its packet to.
The relays are waking up sequentially over time. Whenever a
relay wakes up, each forwarder first evaluates the relay based
on a reward metric (which could be a function of the progress,
towards the sink, made by the relay, and the power required
to get the packet to the relay [4]), and then decides whether to
compete (with the other forwarder) for this relay or continue
to wait for further relays to wake-up. Such a geographical
forwarding setting will serve as an example application of the
stochastic game formulation developed in this paper.
Outline and Our Contributions: We will describe a general
system model in Section II, following which, in Section III, we
will discuss a geographical forwarding problem as an example.
Related work will be presented in Section IV. In Sections V
and VI we will study two variants of the problem (of pro-
gressive complexity), namely, one where complete information
is available to both forwarders and one with only partial
information. We will use stochastic game theory to obtain
solution in terms of (stationary) Nash Equilibrium Policy
Pairs (NEPPs). We will briefly study a cooperative setting in
Section VII, and obtain the Pareto optimal performance curve
which provides a benchmark for the NEPPs. The following
are our main technical contributions:
• For the problem with complete information we obtain
results illustrating the structure of NEPPs (Theorem 2)
• For the partial information case we prove the existence
of a NE strategy (for a certain Bayesian game) within the
class of threshold strategies (Theorem 4). This result will
enable us to construct NEPPs for this case.
• In Section VIII we provide a simulation study of the
use of our formulation in the context of geographical
forwarding. Using realistic parameters from the popular
TelosB wireless mote, we make the following interesting
observation: even for moderate separation between the
two forwarders, the performance of all the NEPPs is
close to the performance of a simple strategy where each
forwarder behaves as if it is alone.
We will finally draw our conclusions in Section IX. For the
ease of presentation we have moved most of the proofs to the
Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let F1 and F2 denote the two competing nodes (i.e.,
players in game theoretic terms), referred to as the forwarders.
We will assume that there are an infinite number of relay
nodes (or resources in general) that are arriving sequentially
at times {Wk : k ≥ 0}, which are the points of a Poisson
process of rate 1τ . Thus, the inter-“arrival” times between
successive relays, Uk := Wk −Wk−1, are i.i.d. (independent
and identically distributed) exponential random variables of
mean τ . We will refer to the relay that arrives at the instant Wk
as the k-th relay. Further, the k-th relay is only ephemerally
available at the instant Wk.
When a relay arrives, either of the forwarders can compete
for it, thereby obtaining a reward. Let Rρ,k, ρ = 1, 2, denote
the reward offered by the k-th relay to Fρ (an example
reward structure will be discussed in Section III). The rewards
Rρ,k (ρ = 1, 2; k ≥ 1) can take values from a finite set
R = {r1, r2, · · · , rn}, where r1 = −∞ and ri < rj for
i < j. The reward pairs (R1,k, R2,k) are i.i.d. across k,
with their common joint p.m.f. (probability mass function)
being pR1,R2(·, ·), For notational simplicity we will denote
pR1,R2(ri, rj) as simply pi,j . Further, let p
(1)
i and p
(2)
j denote
the marginal p.m.f.s of R1,k and R2,k, respectively. Thus,
p
(1)
i =
∑n
j=1 pi,j and p
(2)
j =
∑n
i=1 pi,j .
Actions and Consequences: First we will study (in Sec-
tion V) a completely observable case where the reward pair
(R1,k, R2,k) is revealed to both the forwarders. Later, in
Section VI, we will consider a more involved (albeit more
practical) partially observable case where only R1,k is re-
vealed to F1, and R2,k is revealed to F2. However in either
case, each time a relay arrives, the two forwarders have to
independently choose between one of the following actions:
• s: stop and forward the packet to the current relay, or
• c: continue to wait for further relays to arrive.
Suppose both forwarders choose to stop, then with probabil-
ity (w.p.) ν1, F1 gets the relay in which case F2 has to con-
tinue alone, while with the remaining probability (ν2 = 1−ν1)
F2 gets the relay and F1 continues alone. νρ (ρ = 1, 2)
could be thought of as the probability that Fρ will win the
contention when both forwarders attempt simultaneously. For
mathematical tractability we will assume that the forwarders
make their decision instantaneously at the relay arrival instants.
Further, if a relay is not chosen by either forwarder (i.e., if
both forwarders choose to continue) we will assume that the
relay disappears and is not available for further use.
System State and Forwarding Policy: For the CO case,
(R1,k, R2,k) can be regarded as the state of the system at stage
k, provided both forwarders have not terminated (i.e., chosen
a relay) yet. When one of the forwarder, say F2, terminates,
we will represent the system state as (R1,k, t). Similarly, let
(t, R2,k) and (t, t) represents the state of the system when only
F1 has terminated and when both forwarders have terminated,
respectively. Formally, we can define the state space to be
X =
{
(ri, rj), (ri, t), (t, rj), (t, t) : ri, rj ∈ R
}
. (1)
Given a discrete set S, let ∆(S) denote the set of all p.m.f.s
on S. We now have the following definition.
Definition 1: A forwarding policy pi is a mapping, pi : X →
∆({s,c}), such that F1 (or F2) using pi will choose action
s or c according to the p.m.f. pi(xk) when the state of the
system at stage k ≥ 1 is xk ∈ X . A policy pair (pi1, pi2) is a
tuple of policies such that F1 uses pi1 and F2 uses pi2.
Note that we have restricted to the class of stationary
policies only. We will denote this class of policies as ΠS .
Problem Formulation: Suppose the forwarders use a policy
pair (pi1, pi2), and let x ∈ X be the state of the system at stage
1. Let Kρ, ρ = 1, 2, denote the (random) stage at which Fρ
forwards its packet. Then, the delay incurred byFρ (ρ = 1, 2),
starting from the instant W1 = U1 (first relay’s arrival instant),
is DKρ = U2 + · · ·+ UKρ , and the reward accrued is Rρ,Kρ .
Let Expi1,pi2 [·] denote the expectation operator corresponding to
the probability law, Pxpi1,pi2 , governing the system dynamics
3when the policy pair used is (pi1, pi2) and the initial state is x.
Then, the expected total cost incurred by Fρ is
J (ρ)pi1,pi2(x) = E
x
pi1,pi2
[
DKρ − ηρRρ,Kρ
]
, (2)
where ηρ > 0 is the multiplier used to trade-off between delay
and reward.
Definition 2: We say that a policy pair (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is a Nash
equilibrium policy pair (NEPP) if, for all x ∈ X , J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x) ≤
J
(1)
pi1,pi∗2
(x) for any policy pi1 ∈ ΠS , and J (2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x) ≤ J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi2
(x)
for any policy pi2 ∈ ΠS . Thus, a unilateral deviation from an
NEPP is neither beneficial for F1 nor for F2.
Our objective will be to characterize the solution in terms
of NEPPs.
III. GEOGRAPHICAL FORWARDING EXAMPLE
Before proceeding further, in this section, as a motivating
example, we will construct a reward structure corresponding
to the problem of geographical forwarding1 in sleep-wake
cycling wireless networks. Let F1 and F2 actually represent
two forwarding nodes in a wireless network. As shown in
Fig. 1, let v1 and v2 denote their respective locations. A sink
node is located at v0. Let d denote the range of both the
forwarders. Given any location ` ∈ <2, we define the progress,
Zρ(`), made by location ` with respect to (w.r.t.) Fρ as
Zρ(`) = ‖ vρ − v0 ‖ − ‖ `− v0 ‖ (3)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. Thus, Zρ(`) is simply
the difference between Fρ-to-sink and `-to-sink distances. A
positive value of Zρ(`) implies that location ` is closer to
the sink than Fρ. Now, define the forwarding region, Lρ, of
Fρ as the set of all locations that lie within the range of
Fρ and make non-negative progress w.r.t. Fρ, i.e., denoting
Dρ(`) =‖ `− vρ ‖ to be the distance between ` and Fρ,
Lρ =
{
` : Dρ(`) ≤ d, Zρ(`) ≥ 0
}
. (4)
Let L = L1 ∪ L2 denote the combined forwarding region of
the two forwarders. As depicted in Fig. 1, we will discretize L
into a grid of finite set of m locations {`1, `2, · · · , `m}. Thus,
from here on, whenever we refer to a location ` we mean it
to be one of the above m locations.
Sleep-Wake Process: Without loss of generality, we will
assume that at time 0 each forwarder is holding an alarm
packet which has to forwarded to a downstream relay node
(i.e., a node in its forwarding region). Since the relays are
sleep-wake cycling, each forwarder has to wait until a “good”
relay wakes up (the goodness of a relay will be based on the
reward metric to be discussed in this section).
A practical approach for sleep-wake cycling is the asyn-
chronous periodic sleep-wake process [3], [4], where each
relay i wakes up at the periodic instants {Ti + kT : k ≥ 0}
with {Ti} being i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed)
uniform on [0, T ] (T is referred to as the sleep-wake cycling
period). Now, for dense networks where N is large, if T scales
1Geographical forwarding [5], [6], also known as location based routing,
is a forwarding technique where the assumption is that each node knows its
location as well as the location of the sink node.
Set L of possible
relay locations
v0
Sink
F2
F1v2
v1d
Fig. 1. One-hop forwarding scenario: v0, v1, and v2 are the locations of the
sink, F1, and F2, respectively; d is the range of each forwarder. Possible
relay locations are shown as ◦.
with N such that NT =
1
τ as N → ∞, then the aggregate
point process of relay wake-up instants converges to a Poisson
process of rate 1τ [7]. This observation motivates us to model
the aggregate point process of wake-up instants of relays as a
Poisson point process. Furthermore, the Poisson point process
assumption renders our problem analytically tractable, leading
to interesting structural results.
Thus, formally, we model the sleep-wake cycling by as-
suming that there are an infinite number of relays waking up
(within the combined forwarding region L) sequentially at the
times {Wk : k ≥ 0} which are the points of a Poisson process
of rate 1τ (thus, a new relay wakes up at each instant Wk). Let
Lk ∈ L denote the location of the k-th relay (i.e., the relay
waking up at the instant Wk). The locations {Lk : k ≥ 1} are
i.i.d. random variables with their common p.m.f. (probability
mass function) being q, i.e., P(Lk = `) = q`.
Channel Model: We will use the following standard model
to obtain the transmission power required by Fρ to achieve an
SNR (signal to noise ratio) constraint of Γ at the k-th relay:
Pρ,k =
ΓN0
Gρ,k
(
Dρ(Lk)
dref
)ξ
(5)
where, N0 is the receiver noise variance, Dρ(Lk) is the
distance between Fρ and the k-th relay whose location is
Lk, Gρ,k is the gain of the channel between Fρ and the k-th
relay, ξ is the path-loss attenuation factor, and dref is the far-
field reference distance beyond which the above expression is
valid [8], [9] (our discretization of L is such that the distance
between Fρ and any ` ∈ L is more than dref ).
We will assume that the set of channel gains {Gρ,k : k ≥
1, ρ = 1, 2} are i.i.d. taking values from a finite set G. Also,
let Pmax denote the maximum transmit power with which the
two forwarders can transmit, i.e., if Pρ,k > Pmax then Fρ
cannot forward its packet to the k-th relay. Further, we assume
that the range d (recall Fig. 1) is such that if the k-th relay
is outside the range of Fρ (i.e., Dρ(Lk) > d), then for any
Gρ,k ∈ G, Pρ,k > Pmax, so that Fρ cannot forward to a relay
outside its range. Transmitting to a relay inside its range is
possible, however, provided the channel gain is good enough
so that the power required is less than Pmax.
Relay Rewards: Finally, combining progress and power, we
will define the reward offered by the k-th relay to Fρ as,
Rρ,k =
{
Zρ(Lk)
a
P
(1−a)
ρ,k
if Pρ,k ≤ Pmax
−∞ otherwise,
(6)
4where a ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter used to trade-off between
progress and power. The reward being inversely proportional
to power is clear because it is advantageous to use low power
to get the packet across; Rρ,k is made proportional to Zρ(Lk)
to promote progress towards the sink while choosing a relay
for the next hop.
We will use the above reward structure for conducting nu-
merical and simulation experiments in Section VIII. However,
it is important to note that all our analysis in the subsequent
sections hold for the general model introduced in Section II.
IV. RELATED WORK
We will first make an important comparison with our
prior work on the topic, before proceeding to discuss general
literature from the area of geographical forwarding in wireless
networks. Our problem can also be considered as a variant of
the asset selling problem studied in the operations research
literature; we will discuss related work from this field as well.
Finally, we survey literature from the area of stochastic games.
Our Prior Work: Problem of relay selection, but by a
single forwarder (i.e., the non-competitive version), has been
extensively studied by us, starting from a simple model where
the number of relays is exactly known to the forwarder to the
one where only a belief is known [4]. We have also studied a
variant with channel probing where the relay rewards are not
immediately revealed to the forwarder; instead the forwarder
can choose to learn the reward values by paying an additional
cost [10].
The basic version of our model [4, Section 6] comprises
only one forwarder and a finite number of relay N ; however, in
the basic model we allow for the forwarder to recall a previous
relay unlike here where recalling is not allowed. For this basic
model, the solution is completely in terms of a single threshold
α: forward to the first relay whose reward is more than α; at
the last stage choose the best relay irrespective of its reward
value. From [4, Section 6], we further know that the value
of α does not dependent on N , and hence the solution to
the version of the basic model with infinite number of relays,
should still be same. Furthermore, in the infinite horizon model
there is no advantage in recalling the best relay since there is
no last stage. Thus, one can argue that the solution to the
infinite horizon basic relay selection model, without recall,
should also be characterized by the same threshold α. Here,
we will formally show that this is in fact the solution for one
forwarder when the other forwarder has already terminated
(Lemma 1). However when both the forwarders are present,
the solution is more involved (studied in Section V-B). Thus,
the competitive model studied here is a generalization of the
aforementioned version of the basic relay selection model.
Geographical Forwarding: The problem of choosing a
next-hop relay arises in the context of geographical for-
warding; geographical forwarding [5], [6] is a forwarding
technique where the prerequisite is that the nodes know their
respective locations as well as the sink’s location. The method
of geographical forwarding was already envisioned in the 80’s
in the context of routing in packet radio networks (PRNs) [11],
[12]. One of the simplest geographical forwarding technique is
the greedy algorithm where each node forwards to a neighbor
in its communication region which makes maximum progress
towards the sink. This greedy algorithm is referred to as the
MFR (Max Forward within Radius) routing in [11]. Akin to
MFR is the NFP (Nearest with Forward Progress) proposed
in [12] where a node with a positive progress, and closest to
the transmitting node is chosen. A generalization of MFR and
NFP routing is to randomly choose any neighbor which makes
a positive progress towards the sink [13].
More recently, there are work that apply geographical
forwarding for routing in sleep-wake cycling networks. For
instance, Zorzi and Rao in [14] propose an algorithm called
GeRaF (Geographical Random Forwarding) which, at each
forwarding stage, chooses the relay making the largest
progress. For a sleep-wake cycling network, Liu et al. in [15]
propose a relay selection approach as a part of CMAC, a
protocol for geographical packet forwarding. Under CMAC,
node i chooses an r0 that minimizes the expected normalized
latency (which is the average ratio of one-hop delay and
progress). Akin to the relay selection problem is the problem
of channel selection [16], [17] where a transmitter, given
several channels, has to choose one for its transmissions.
Analogous to rewards in our case, the transmitter’s decision
is based on the throughput the transmitter can achieve on a
channel. Links to more literature on similar work from the
context of wireless networks can be found in [4]. However all
these work do not consider the competitive scenario like ours.
Asset Selling Problem: Finally, our relay selection problem
can be considered to be equivalent to the asset selling problem,
which is a class of the optimal stopping problems studied in
the operations research literature (other examples of stopping
problems include the secretary problem [18], bandit problem
[19], etc). The basic asset selling problem [20, Section 4.4]
[21] comprises a single seller (analogous to a forwarder in our
model) and a sequence of i.i.d. offers (rewards in our case).
The seller’s objective is to choose an offer so as to maximize
a combination of the offer value and the number of previous
offers rejected. Over the years, several variants of the basic
problem have been studied. For instance, In [22], David and
Levi consider a model in which the offers arrive at the points of
a renewal process. Kang in [23] has considered a model where
a cost has to be paid to recall the previous best offer; see [23]
for further references to literature on models with uncertain
recall. Variants with unknown offer (or reward) distribution,
or one where a parameter of the offer distribution is unknown
have been studied in [24], [25].
Our competitive model here can be considered as a game
variant of the basic asset selling problem, where the two
forwarders are analogous to the sellers and the reward values
are analogous to the offers. Although one game variant has
been studied by Nakagami in [26], the specific cost structure in
our problem enables us to prove results such as the existence of
Nash equilibrium policy pair within the class of threshold rules
(Theorem 4). Further, we also study a completely observable
case which is not considered in [26].
Similarly, literature is available on the game version of the
secretary problem [27], [28], but these consider the simpler
case where the reward offered by an arriving secretary (or
5resource) to both players is the same. Moreover, the objective
in the secretary problem is to maximize the probability of
choosing the best secretary (resource), which is in contrast to
our setting (asset selling) which involves a trade-off between
selection delay and reward. Further, a partially observable
scenario is not studied in these work.
Stochastic Games: Stochastic games can be considered as
a generalization of Markov decision processes (MDPs), in the
sense that a stochastic game comprises multiple agents (in
contrast to a single agent in an MDP), who jointly control the
state of the system while individually incurring a cost in doing
so. Several references [29]–[34] are available on the topic
starting from the seminal work by Shapley [35]. However,
most of these work study either discounted or average cost
objectives, unlike our problem which falls within the realm
of total-cost transient stochastic games (or stopping games
[36, Part III]). Our formulation can be alternatively thought
of as a quitting game [37]. However, we have introduced state
transitions and state dependent quitting cost which are not
considered in the model studied in [37].
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, the model
proposed in this paper along with the structural results we
have derived, are new contributions to the field of stopping
games.
V. COMPLETELY OBSERVABLE (CO) CASE
For the CO model we assume that the reward pair,
(R1,k, R2,k), of the k-th relay is entirely revealed to both the
forwarders. Recalling the geographical forwarding example
in Section III, this case would model the scenario where
the reward is simply the progress, Zρ(Lk), the relay makes
towards the sink, i.e., if a = 1 in (6). Thus, observing
the location Lk of the k-th relay, both forwarders (assuming
that both a-priori know the locations v1, v2 and v0; see the
following remark) can entirely compute (R1,k, R2,k).
Remark: Justification for knowing the locations is as fol-
lows. All the nodes are equipped with GPS (Global Positioning
System) devices, using which each node can know its own
location. Next, the sink being a fixed node, its location is
already made available to all the nodes before deployment.
Finally, each forwarder’s knowledge of the other’s location can
be acquired when both forwarders broadcast control packets
in response to the control packet transmitted by the first relay.
We will now proceed to formulate the completely observ-
able case as a stochastic game. Using a key theorem from the
book by Filar and Vrieze on Competitive Markov Decision
Processes [29], we will characterize the structure of NEPPs.
A. Stochastic Game Formulation
Limiting ourselves to the case of finite set of states and finite
action sets, formally a stochastic game can be represented by
a tuple (N ,X , {Aρ}, T, {gρ}) where,
• N is the set of agents or players,
• X is the finite set of system states,
• A = ×ρ∈NAρ is the joint-action space with Aρ repre-
senting the finite action set of agent ρ,
• T : X × A → ∆(X ) (the set of all p.m.f.s on X ) is
the probability transition kernel, i.e., T (x′|x, a) is the
probability that the next state is x′ given that the current
state is x and the current joint-action is a = (aρ : ρ ∈ N ),
• gρ : X ×A → < is the (expected) one-step-cost function
of agent ρ.
We will now identify each of these components for our
problem. The two forwarders, F1 and F2, are the players
(i.e., N = {F1, F2}), and X in (1) is the state space. The
action sets are A1 = A2 = {s,c}.
Transition Probabilities: Recall that pi,j is the joint p.m.f
of (R1,k, R2,k), p
(1)
i and p
(2)
j are the marginal p.m.f.s of R1,k
and R2,k, respectively, and νρ (ρ = 1, 2) is the probability
that Fρ will win the contention if both forwarders cooperate.
Now, the transition probability when the current state is of the
form x = (ri, rj) can be written as,
T (x′|x, a) =

pi′,j′ if a = (c, c), x′ = (ri′ , rj′)
p
(1)
i′ if a = (c, s), x
′ = (ri′ , t)
p
(2)
j′ if a = (s, c), x
′ = (t, rj′)
ν2p
(1)
i′ if a = (s, s), x
′ = (ri′ , t)
ν1p
(2)
j′ if a = (s, s), x
′ = (t, rj′)
0 otherwise.
(7)
Note that when the joint-action is (s, s), ν2p
(1)
i′ is the proba-
bility that F2 gets the current relay and the reward offered by
the next relay to F1 is ri′ . Similarly, ν1p
(2)
j′ is the probability
(again when the joint-action is (s,s)) that F1 gets the relay
and the reward value of the next relay to F2 is rj′ .
Next, when the state is of the form x = (ri, t) (i.e., F2 has
already terminated) the transition probabilities depend only on
the action a1 of F1 and is given by,
T (x′|x, a) =
 p
(1)
i′ if a1 = c, x
′ = (ri′ , t)
1 if a1 = s, x′ = (t, t)
0 otherwise.
(8)
Similarly one can write the expression for T (x′|x, a) when
the state is x = (t, rj). Finally, the state (t, t) is absorbing so
that T ((t, t)|(t, t), a) = 1.
One-Step Costs: The one-step costs should be such that, for
any policy pair (pi1, pi2), the sum of all one-step costs incurred
by Fρ (ρ = 1, 2) should equal the total cost in (2). With
this in mind, in Table 1 we write the pair of one-step costs,
(g1(x, a), g2(x, a)), incurred byF1 andF2 for different joint-
actions, a = (a1, a2), when the current state is x = (ri, rj).
a = (a1, a2) (g1(x, a), g2(x, a))
(c, c) (τ, τ)
(c, s) (τ,−η2rj)
(s, c) (−η1ri, τ)
(s, s) (−η1ri, τ) w.p. ν1
(τ,−η2rj) w.p. ν2
TABLE 1
ONE-STEP COSTS WHEN x = (ri, rj).
From Table 1 we see that if the joint action is (c, c) then
both forwarders continue incurring a cost of τ which is the
average time until the next relay arrives. When one of the
forwarder, say F2, chooses to stop (i.e., the joint action is
(c, s)) then F2, forwarding its packet to the chosen relay,
6incurs a terminating cost of −η2rj , whileF1 simply continues
incurring an average waiting delay of τ . Analogous is the case
whenever the joint action is (s, c). Finally, if both forwarders
compete (i.e., the case (s, s)), then with probability νρ, Fρ
gets the relay incurring the terminating cost while the other
forwarder has to continue.
a1 (g1(x, a), g2(x, a))
c (τ, 0)
s (−η1ri, 0)
TABLE 2
x = (ri, t)
a2 (g1(x, a), g2(x, a))
c (0, τ)
s (0,−η2rj)
TABLE 3
x = (t, rj)
When the state is of the form (ri, t) the cost incurred
by F2 is 0 for any joint-action a, and further the one-step
cost incurred by F1 depends only on the action a1 of F1.
Analogous situation holds for F2 when the state is (t, rj).
These costs are given in Table 2 and 3, respectively. Finally,
the cost incurred by both the forwarders once the termination
state (t, t) is reached is 0.
Now, given a policy pair (pi1, pi2) (recall Definition 1) and
an initial state x ∈ X , let {Xk : k ≥ 1} denote the sequence of
(random) states traversed by the system, and let {(A1,k, A2,k) :
k ≥ 1} denote the sequence of joint-actions. The total cost in
(2) can now be expressed as the sum of all the one-step costs
as follows:
J (ρ)pi1,pi2(x) =
∞∑
k=1
Expi1,pi2
[
gρ(Xk, (A1,k, A2,k))
]
. (9)
B. Characterization of NEPPs
States of the form (ri, t), (t, rj)
Once the system enters a state of the form (ri, t), since
only F1 is present in the system, we essentially have an
MDP problem where F1 is attempting to optimize its cost.
Formally, if (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is an NEPP then it can be argued
2 that
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t) is the optimal cost to F1 with pi∗1 being an
optimal policy; the cost incurred by F2 is 0 and pi∗2 can be
arbitrary, but for simplicity we fix pi∗2(ri, t) = s for all i ∈ [n].
Hence J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (·, t) satisfies the following Bellman optimality
equation:
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t) = min
{
− η1ri, D(1)
}
, (10)
where
D(1) = τ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri′ , t) (11)
is the expected cost of continuing alone in the system (τ is
the one-step cost and the remaining term is the future cost-to-
go). −η1ri in the min-expression above is the cost of stopping.
Thus, denoting D
(1)
−η1 by α
(1), whenever the state is of the form
(ri, t) an optimal policy is as follows:
pi∗1(ri, t) =
{
s if ri ≥ α(1)
c otherwise. (12)
Remark: As mentioned earlier (recall the discussion in
related work), the solution to the basic relay selection problem,
2Using the definition of an NEPP and the fact that the costs and the state
transitions do not depend on the policy of the other forwarder anymore.
comprising a single forwarder (say only F1) and a finite
number of relays N , is characterized in terms of a single
threshold α. Furthermore, from our earlier work [4, Section 6]
we know that α is the unique fixed point of
β(1)(x) = E
[
max{x,R1}
]
− τ
η1
, (13)
where the expectation in the above expression is w.r.t. the
p.m.f. p(1) of R1. Here we will show that α(1) is the fixed
point of β(1), formalizing our earlier claim that the competitive
model with only one forwarder and the infinite horizon basic
model are equivalent. Although this result can be deduced by
showing the equivalence between our competitive model with
a single forwarder and the infinite horizon version of the asset
selling problem, we prove it here for completeness.
Lemma 1: α(1) is the unique fixed point of β(1)(x) (x ∈
(−∞, rn]) in (13).
Proof: We will first show that β(1) is a contraction
mapping. Then, from the Banach fixed point theorem [38]
it follows that there exists a unique fixed point α∗ of β(1).
Next, through an induction argument we will prove that
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t) = min
{
− η1ri,−η1α∗
}
. Finally, substituting
for J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) in α
(1) = D
(1)
−η1 (recall D
(1) from (11)) and
simplifying, we obtain the desired result. Details of the proof
are available in Appendix A.
Similarly, when the state is of the form (t, rj) (i.e.,
F1 has already terminated), if (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is an NEPP then,
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj) = 0 and pi∗1(t, rj) = s, while J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj)
satisfies
J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj) = min
{
− η2rj , D(2)
}
, (14)
where D(2) = τ+
∑
j′ p
(2)
j′ J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj′). Further, α(2) = D
(2)
−η2 ,
is the unique fixed point of β(2)(x) = E
[
max{x,R2}
]
−
τ
η2
, where now the expectation is w.r.t. the p.m.f. p(2) of R2.
Finally, an optimal policy pi∗2 is such that
pi∗2(t, rj) =
{
s if rj ≥ α(2)
c otherwise. (15)
States of the form (ri, rj)
This is the more interesting case where both forwarders
are present in the system and are competing to choose a
relay. When the state is of the form (ri, rj), if F1 decides
to continue while F2 chooses to stop (i.e., the joint-action is
(c, s)), then F2 terminates by incurring a cost of −η2rj so
that the next state is of the form (ri′ , t). Hence the expected
total cost incurred by F1, if it uses the policy in (12) from
the next stage onwards, is D(1) (recall (11)). Similarly, if the
joint-action is (s, c) then F1 terminates incurring a cost of
−η1ri, and F2 incurs a cost of D(2) if it uses the policy in
(15) from the next stage onwards.
If both forwarders decide to stop (joint-action is (s, s))
then with probability ν1, F1 gets the relay in which case F2
continues alone, and with probability ν2 it is vice versa. Thus,
the expected cost incurred by F1 is,
E(1)(ri) = ν1(−η1ri) + ν2D(1), (16)
7and that by F2 is,
E(2)(rj) = ν1D
(2) + ν2(−η2rj). (17)
Finally, if both forwarders choose to continue (i.e., if the
joint-action is (c, c)) then the next state is again of the form
(ri′ , rj′). Thus if (pi1, pi2) is the policy pair used from the next
stage onwards then the expected costs incurred by F1 and F2
are, respectively,
C(1)pi1,pi2 = τ +
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′J
(1)
pi1,pi2(ri′ , rj′) (18)
C(2)pi1,pi2 = τ +
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′J
(2)
pi1,pi2(ri′ , rj′). (19)
We are now ready to state the following main theorem
(adapted from [29]), which relates the “NEPPs of the stochas-
tic game” with the “Nash equilibrium strategies of a certain
static game” played at a stage. The various cost terms de-
scribed above are used to construct this static game. We state
the theorem below with the understanding that for states of
the form x = (ri, t) and x = (t, rj), pi∗1(x) and pi∗2(x) are as
in (12) and (15), respectively.
Theorem 1: Given a policy pair, (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2), for each state
x = (ri, rj) construct the static game given in Table 4.
c s
c C(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
, C
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
D(1),−η2rj
s −η1ri, D(2) E(1)(ri), E(2)(rj)
TABLE 4
STATIC STAGE GAME.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
a) (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is an NEPP.
b) For each x = (ri, rj), (pi∗1(x), pi
∗
2(x)) is a Nash equi-
librium (NE) strategy for the game in Table 4. Fur-
ther, the expected payoff pair at this NE strategy is,
(J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x), J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x)).
Proof: Although the proof of this theorem is along the
lines of the proof of Theorem 4.6.5 in [29], however some
additional efforts are required since the proof in [29] is for
the case where the costs are discounted, while ours is a total
cost undiscounted stochastic game. Further, the presence of a
cost-free absorption state for each player renders our problem
transient by which we mean, when the policy of one player is
fixed the problem of obtaining the optimal policy for the other
player is a stopping problem [39]. Using this property we have
modified the proof of [29, Theorem 4.6.5] appropriately so that
the result holds for our case. For details, see Appendix B.
Discussion: In this discussion for simplicity we will omit
(pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) from all the associated notations. Now, Theorem 1
can be seen as an extension of the Bellman optimality equation
in (10), where to obtain J (1)(ri, t) we require the cost term
D(1) in (11), which in turn depends on the function J (1)(·, t).
This essentially suggests that J (1)(·, t) is the fixed point of the
Bellman equation in (10). Similarly, here we see that, given
the cost pair (C(1), C(2)), one can obtain (J (1)(x), J (2)(x)) by
solving the game in Table 4. However, computing (C(1), C(2))
itself will require the function pair (J (1)(·), J (2)(·)), thus
suggesting that (J (1)(·), J (2)(·)) has to be fixed point of a
(,)
(Γ1,Γ2)
ζ (2)
(,s)
(s,s)
(s,)
α(1)ζ (1) ri
rj
α(2)
(s,)
(,s)
R1
R4
R2
R5
R3
Fig. 2. Illustration of the various regions along with the NE strategies
corresponding to these regions.
mapping which involves computing the payoff pair of the
static game in Table 4. Furthermore, analogous to computing
the minimum in (10) to obtain the optimal action, here, by
computing the NE strategies of the game in Table 4 we obtain
the solution to our stochastic game.
Assuming that the cost pair (C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 , C
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
) is given to us,
we now proceed to obtain all the NE strategies of the game
in Table 4. We will first require the following key lemma.
Lemma 2: For an NEPP, (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2), the various costs are
ordered as follows:
D(1) ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 and D
(2) ≤ C(2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 . (20)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Discussion: The above lemma becomes intuitive once we
recall that D(1) is the optimal cost incurred by F1 if it is
alone in the system, while C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 is the cost incurred if F2 is
also present, and competing with F1 in choosing a relay. One
would expect F1 to incur a lower cost without the competing
forwarder.
For notational simplicity, from here on, we will denote the
costs C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 and C
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
as simply C(1) and C(2). We will
write C for the pair (C(1), C(2)). An important consequence
of Lemma 2 is that, while solving the game in Table 4, it is
sufficient to only consider cost pairs, (C(1), C(2)), which are
ordered as in the lemma; the other cases (e.g., D(1) > C(1) or
D(2) > C(2)) cannot occur, and hence need not be considered.
Further, for convenience let us denote the thresholds C
(1)
−η1 and
C(2)
−η2 by ζ
(1) and ζ(2), respectively (recall that we already have,
α(1) = D
(1)
−η1 and α
(2) = D
(2)
−η2 ). Then, the solution (i.e., the NE
strategies) to the game in Table 4, for each (ri, rj) pair, is as
depicted in Fig. 2.
We see that the thresholds (α(1), ζ(1)) and (α(2), ζ(2))
partition the reward pair set, {(ri, rj) : i, j ∈ [n]}, into 5
regions (R1, · · · ,R5)3 such that the NE strategy (strategies)
corresponding to each region are different. For instance, for
any (ri, rj) ∈ R1, (c, c) (i.e., both forwarders continue) is the
only NE strategy, while within R2, (s, c) is the NE strategy,
and so on. All regions contain a unique pure NE strategy
3These regions depend on the cost pair C; for simplicity we neglect C in
their notation. However, we will invoke this dependency when required.
8except for R4 where (s, c), (c, s), and the mixed strategy
(Γ1,Γ2) (Γρ is the probability with which Fρ chooses s) are
all NE strategies. The expression for Γ1 is
Γ1 =
−η2rj − C(2)(
− η2rj − C(2)
)
−
(
E(2)(rj)−D(2)
) . (23)
Analogously one can write the expression for Γ2. For details
on how to solve the game in Table 4 to obtain the various
regions, see Appendix D. Finally, we summarize the observa-
tions made thus far in the form of the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The NE strategies of the game in Table 4 are
completely characterized by the threshold pairs (α(ρ), ζ(ρ)),
ρ = 1, 2 as follows (recall Fig. 2 for illustration):
• If ri is less than ζ(1), then the NE strategy recommends
c for F1 irrespective of the reward value rj of F2.
• On the other hand, if ri is more than α(1), then the NE
strategy recommends action s for F1 irrespective of the
value of rj (note that this is exactly the action F1 would
choose if it was alone in the system; see the discussion
following (12)).
• Finally, the presence of the competing forwarder F2 is
felt by F1 only when its reward value ri is between ζ(1)
and α(1), in which case the NE strategies are: (s, c) if
rj < ζ
(2); (s, c), (c, s) and (Γ1,Γ2) if ζ(2) ≤ rj ≤ α(2);
and (c, s) if rj > α(2).
Analogous results hold for F2.
C. Constructing NEPPs from NE strategies
The cost terms D(1) and D(2) can be easily computed
by solving the optimality equations (10) and (14), respec-
tively. Alternatively, we can first compute the fixed points of
β(1)(·) and β(2)(·) to obtain α(1) and α(2), respectively (recall
Lemma 1). Then, D(1) = −η1α(1) and D(2) = −η2α(2).
The costs C(1) and C(2) (in (18) and (19)) depend on the
particular NEPP used, i.e., require the cost terms J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, rj)
and J (2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, rj) for all (ri, rj) to compute them. Con-
versely, Part-(b) of Theorem 1 suggests that J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, rj)
(respectively, J (2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, rj)) can be obtained by computing
the expected cost incurred by F1 (respectively, F2) at a NE
strategy of the game in Table 4, which in turn requires the
terms C(1) and C(2). Hence, to obtain (C(1), C(2)) we proceed
by expressing (C(1), C(2)) as the fixed point of a mapping T
which can then be used to compute these costs.
Suppose (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is a NEPP such that for all x = (ri, rj) ∈
R4(C) the NE strategy (pi∗1(x), pi∗2(x)) is (s, c). Then using
part 2(b) of Theorem 1 we can write,
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, rj) =

C(1) if (ri, rj) ∈ R1(C)
−η1ri if (ri, rj) ∈ R2(C)
D(1) if (ri, rj) ∈ R3(C)
−η1ri if (ri, rj) ∈ R5(C)
E(1)(ri) if (ri, rj) ∈ R4(C).
(24)
Using the above in (18), C(1) can be written as C(1) = T1(C)
where the function T1(C) is as in (21) (where for simplicity,
we have used (i, j) instead of (ri, rj)). Similarly, C(2) can be
expressed as C(2) = T2(C); see (22). Thus, C is a fixed point
of the mapping T (C) := (T1(C), T2(C)).
We do not have results showing that T indeed has a fixed
point or equivalently that an NEPP (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) always exists,
4
although such a result holds for the discounted stochastic
game [29, Theorem 4.6.4] (recall that ours is a transient
stochastic game). However, in our numerical results section
(Section VIII) we were able to numerically obtain C by
iteration. Thus, we begin with an initial C(0) such that
C(1)(0) < D(1) and C(2)(0) < D(2), and inductively iterate
to obtain C(k) = T (C(k− 1)) until convergence is achieved.
Finally, given a fixed point C, we obtain the corresponding
NEPP (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) by constructing the various regions as in Fig. 2.
Other NEPPs: Recall that to obtain (C(1), C(2)) we had re-
stricted (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) to use NE strategy (s, c) whenever (ri, rj) ∈
R4(C). We can similarly obtain NEPPs (pi◦1 , pi◦2) and (pi1 , pi2 )
(whose corresponding cost pairs areC◦ andC) by restricting
to the NE strategies (c, s) and (Γ1,Γ2) whenever (ri, rj) ∈
R4(C◦) and (ri, rj) ∈ R4(C), respectively. In Section VIII
we will numerically compare the performances of all these
various NEPPs.
VI. PARTIALLY OBSERVABLE CASE
Let us first formally introduce a finite location set L. Let Lk
denote the location of the k-th relay. The locations {Lk : k ≥
1} are i.i.d with their common p.m.f. being (q` : ` ∈ L). Recall
that for the PO case we assume that only Rρ,k is revealed to
Fρ (ρ = 1, 2). In addition, we will assume that Lk is revealed
to both the forwarders.
Recalling the geographical forwarding example from Sec-
tion III, the PO case corresponds to the scenario where, in
addition to Lk, the gains Gρ,k are required to compute Rρ,k,
i.e., if a < 1 in (6). Hence, F1 not knowing G2,k cannot
compute R2,k. However, knowing the channel gain distribution
(recall that the gains are identically distributed) it is possible
4This equivalence can be easily shown by first using (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) in part-(a) of
Theorem 1 to conclude that part-(b) holds, and then simply from the definition
of T it will follow that it has a fixed point. For the other direction, given a
fixed point C of T , one can easily obtain the corresponding NEPP (pi∗1 , pi∗2)
by constructing the various regions as shown in Fig. 2.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T1(C) = τ +
∑
(i,j)∈R1(C)
pi,jC
(1) +
∑
(i,j)∈R2(C)∪R4(C)
pi,j(−η1ri) +
∑
(i,j)∈R3(C)
pi,jD
(1) +
∑
(i,j)∈R5(C)
pi,jE
(1)(ri)(21)
T2(C) = τ +
∑
(i,j)∈R1(C)
pi,jC
(2) +
∑
(i,j)∈R2(C)∪R4(C)
pi,jD
(2) +
∑
(i,j)∈R3(C)
pi,j(−η2rj) +
∑
(i,j)∈R5(C)
pi,jE
(2)(rj).(22)
9for F1 to compute the probability distribution of R2,k given
Lk. Similarly, F2 can compute the distribution of R1,k given
Lk. Further, since the gains, (G1,k, G2,k), are independent,
it follows that R1,k and R2,k are independent given Lk (but
unconditionally they may be dependent).
Formally, given that Lk = `, we will assume the following
independence condition:
pR1,R2|Lk(ri, rj |`) = pR1|Lk(ri|`)pR2|Lk(rj |`). (25)
For simplicity, we will denote the conditional p.m.f.s
pR1|Lk(ri|`) and pR2|Lk(rj |`), i, j ∈ [n], by p(1)i|` and p(2)j|` ,
respectively.
Remark: Usually for a model with partial observations the
belief that F1 will maintain about R2,k will simply be the
conditional distribution pR2|R1(rj |ri) = pi,jp(1)i . However, we
have exploited the particular structure in our reward expression
to come up with the independence condition in (25). This
condition will enable us to prove a key result later which is
otherwise not possible (see the remark following Lemma 4).
Finally, all our subsequent results will hold for a more general
model wherever the independence condition in (25) will hold.
We will now proceed to formulate our partially observable
model as a partially observable stochastic game (POSG). We
will first formally describe the problem setting and then briefly
discuss POSGs, before proceeding to our main results.
A. Problem Formulation
The actual state space of the system continues to be X
(see (1)). However, each forwarder now gets to observe only
its part of the actual state (i.e., only its reward value) along
with the relay’s location. Thus, when the k-th relay arrives, and
if both forwarders are still competing then the observations of
F1 and F2 are of the form (ri, `) and (`, rj), respectively,
where (ri, rj) is the actual state, Lk = ` is the location of the
k-th relay. Suppose F2 has already terminated before stage
k then5 the location information is no more required by F1,
and hence we will denote its observation as (ri, t) which is
simply the system state. Finally, when F1 terminates we use t
to denote its subsequent observations. Thus, we can write the
observation space of F1 as,
O1 =
{
(ri, `), (ri, t), t : i ∈ [n], ` ∈ [m]
}
. (26)
Similarly, the observation space of F2 is given by
O2 =
{
(`, rj), (t, rj), t : j ∈ [n], ` ∈ [m]
}
. (27)
Definition 3: We will modify6 the definition of a policy pair,
(pi1, pi2) (see Definition 1), such that pi1 : O1 → {s, c} and
pi2 : O2 → {s, c}. Thus, the decision to stop or continue
by F1 and F2, when the k-th relay arrives is based on their
respective observations o1,k ∈ O1 and o2,k ∈ O2.
Remark: Note that we have restricted the PO policies to be
deterministic (and as before stationary), i.e., pi1(o1) is either s
5As mentioned earlier, F1 will come to know about F2’s termination by
listening to the exchange of control packets between F2 and the chosen relay
just before termination.
6In this section we will apply overline to most of the symbols in order to
distinguish them from the corresponding symbols that have already appeared
in Section V.
or c without mixing between the two. Let ΠD denote the set of
all such deterministic policies. Restricting to ΠD is primarily
to simplify the analysis. However, it is not immediately clear
if a partially observable NEPP (to be formally defined very
soon) should even exist within the class ΠD. Our main result
is to construct a Bayesian stage game and prove that this game
contains pure strategy (or deterministic) NE vectors using
which PO-NEPPs in ΠD can be constructed.
Let {(O1,k, O2,k): k ≥ 1}, denote the sequence of joint-
observation at stage k, and let {Xk : k ≥ 1} as before denote
the sequence of states. Then the expected cost incurred byFρ,
ρ = 1, 2, when the PO policy pair used is (pi1, pi2), and when
its initial observation is oρ, can be written as
G
(ρ)
pi1,pi2
(oρ) =
∞∑
k=1
Eoρpi1,pi2
[
gρ(Xk, (A1,k, A2,k))
]
, (28)
where A1,k = pi1(O1,k) and A2,k = pi2(O2,k).
Similar to the completely observable case, the objective for
the partially observable (PO) case is to characterize PO-NEPPs
which are defined as follows:
Definition 4: We say that a PO policy pair (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) is a
PO-NEPP if G(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (o1) ≤ G
(1)
pi1,pi∗2
(o1) for all o1 ∈ O1 and
PO policy pi1 ∈ ΠD, and G(2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (o2) ≤ G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi2
(o2) where
o2 ∈ O2 and pi2 ∈ ΠD.
We will end this section with the expressions for the various
cost terms corresponding to a PO-NEPP, which are analogues
of the cost terms in Section V.
Various Cost Terms: Recall the expression for D(1) from
(11). Given a NEPP (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2), D
(1) is the cost incurred by F1
if it continues alone. Similar expressions can be written for a
PO-NEPP (pi∗1, pi
∗
2):
D
(1)
= τ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri′ , t). (29)
Similarly, for F2, the cost of continuing alone is
D
(2)
= τ +
∑
j′
p
(2)
j′ G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj′). (30)
The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 3: Let (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) be an NEPP and (pi
∗
1, pi
∗
2) be a PO-
NEPP then J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) = G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t) and J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj) =
G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj).
Proof: Whenever F1 is alone in the system, all its
observations (which are of the form (ri, t) until F1 ter-
minates) are exactly the actual states traversed by the sys-
tem. Hence the problem of obtaining G(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) is iden-
tical to the MDP problem of obtaining J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) in Sec-
tion V-B, so that G(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) satisfies the Bellman equa-
tion in (10). Since the solution to (10) is unique [39] we
obtain J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) = G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t). Similarly it follows that
J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj) = G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj).
Discussion: An immediate consequence of the above lemma
is that D
(1)
= D(1) and D
(2)
= D(2). Further, if (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) is a
PO-NEPP then for states of the form (ri, t), pi∗1(ri, t) is same
as pi∗1(ri, t) in (12). Similarly, for states of the form (t, rj),
pi∗2(t, rj) is same as that in (15).
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However, the analogues of the cost terms C(1)pi1,pi2 and C
(2)
pi1,pi2
(recall (18) and (19)) are different for the partially observable
case. The expressions for these are,
C
(1)
pi1,pi2 = τ +
∑
`′,i′
q`′ · p(1)i′|`′ ·G(1)pi1,pi2(ri′ , `′), (31)
C
(2)
pi1,pi2 = τ +
∑
`′,j′
q`′ · p(2)j′|`′ ·G(2)pi1,pi2(`′, rj′). (32)
Finally, similar to the result in Lemma 2, we can show that
for a PO-NEPP (pi∗1, pi
∗
2),
D
(1) ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 and D
(2) ≤ C(2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 . (33)
The proof of these is along exactly the same lines as the proof
of Lemma 2. We do not repeat it for brevity.
B. Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG)
A POSG is a tuple (N ,X ,O, {Aρ}, Tˆ , {gρ}), where N , X ,
Aρ, and gρ are as before (see Section V-A), while
• O = ×ρ∈NOρ is the joint-observation space, with Oρ
being the observation space of player ρ, and
• Tˆ : X × O ×A → ∆(X × O) is the transition function
where Tˆ (x′, o′|x, o, a) is the probability that the next state
and the joint-observation is (x′, o′) conditioned on the
event that the current state, joint-observation and joint-
action is (x, o, a).
In the previous section we have seen that the NEPPs
for a stochastic game can be obtained by constructing a
normal-form static stage game. Similarly for POSGs, there
is work (for instance see, [40]) that constructs a game which
is effectively played at each stage, however, with the play-
ers not knowing the exact state of the system the stage
game now happens to be a Bayesian game [41, Chapter 9].
Hence, the drawback with POSGs in general is that, at each
stage k, each player needs to maintain a belief (distribution)
about the entire history of joint-observations and joint-actions,
((o1,1, o2,1), (a1,1, a1,2), · · · , (a1,k−1, a2,k−1), (o1,k, o2,k),
(referred to as the joint-type of the Bayesian game), obtaining
which for a general POSG is computationally intensive.
For this reason the authors in [42] have studied a restriction
of POSGs referred to as, Markov games of Incomplete infor-
mation (MGII). In MGIIs the transition function Tˆ satisfies
the following Markov property: player-1’s belief about the
player-2’s current observation, o′2, is independent of player-2’s
previous observation, o2, given the current state, x′, previous
state, x, and player-1’s current and previous observations,
o′1 and o1, respectively, i.e., for two different observations
u, v ∈ O2 of player-2, Tˆ (o′2|x′, x, o′2, o1, o2 = u) =
Tˆ (o′2|x′, x, o′1, o1, o2 = v). Similar Markov structure should
hold for other players also. For our case it is easy to check
that the above condition is trivially satisfied, primarily because
all the associated random variables, {Lk} and {(R1,k, R2,k)},
are i.i.d. across the stage index k.
A major advantage with MGIIs is that the current joint-
observation constitutes the type of the Bayesian game to be
played at that stage. With this in mind, we will set up a
Bayesian stage game in the next section, with (ri, `) and (`, rj)
constituting the type of the game at stage k, provided both
forwarders are still competing7 at stage k.
C. Bayesian Stage Game
We are now ready to provide a solution to the partially
observable case in terms of a certain Bayesian game [41,
Chapter 9] which is effectively played at any stage whenever
both forwarders are contending. For the completely observable
case, given a policy pair (pi1, pi2), corresponding to each
(ri, rj) pair we constructed the normal-form game in Table 4.
However here, given a PO policy pair (pi1, pi2) and given the
observation (ri, `), F1’s belief that the game in Table 4 (with
(C
(1)
pi1,pi2 , C
(2)
pi1,pi2) replaced by (C
(1)
pi1,pi2C
(2)
pi1,pi2)) will be played
is p(2)j|` , j ∈ [n]. Hence, F1 needs to first compute the costs
incurred for playing s and c, averaged over all observations
(`, rj), j ∈ [n], of F2. We will formally develop these in the
following.
Strategy vectors and corresponding costs: Fixing the PO-
policy pair to be (pi1, pi2) (unless otherwise stated), we will
refer to the subsequent development (which includes, the
strategy vectors, various costs, best responses and NE vectors,
to be discussed next) as the Bayesian game corresponding to
(pi1, pi2), denoted G(pi1, pi2).
Definition 5: For ` ∈ L (recall that L is the set of possible
relay locations), we define a strategy vector, f`, of F1 as
f` : {ri : i ∈ [n]} → {s, c}. Similarly, a strategy vector
g` of F2 is g` : {rj : j ∈ [n]} → {s, c}. Thus, given the
observation (ri, `) of F1, f` decides for F1 whether to stop
or continue.
Now, given the strategy vector g` of F2, and the location
information `, F1’s belief that F2 will choose action c is
g˜` =
∑
j:g`(rj)=c
p
(2)
j|` ; (34)
(1−g˜`) is the probability thatF2 will stop. Thus, the expected
cost incurred by F1 for playing s when its observation is
(ri, `) and when F2 uses g` is
C
(1)
s,g`(ri) = g˜`(−η1ri) + (1− g˜`)E(1)(ri), (35)
where, recall from (16) that E(1)(ri) = ν1(−η1ri) + ν2D(1).
The various terms in (35) can be understood as follows: g˜`
is the probability that F2 will continue in which case F1
(having chosen the action s) stops, incurring a terminating
cost of −η1ri, while (1 − g˜`) is the probability that F2 will
stop in which case the expected cost is, ν1(−η1ri) + ν2D(1);
ν1 is the probability that F1 gets the relay and terminates
incurring a cost of (−η1ri), otherwise w.p. ν2, F2 gets the
relay in which case F1 continues alone, the expected cost of
which is D
(1)
= D(1) (from Lemma 3).
The expected cost of continuing when F1’s observation is
(ri, `) is
C
(1)
c,g`(ri) = g˜`C
(1)
pi1,pi2 + (1− g˜`)D(1). (36)
7When only one forwarder is present we already know that the solution can
be obtained by solving an MDP problem as in Section V-B (see Lemma 3).
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From the above expression we see that the cost of continuing
is a constant in the sense that it does not depend on the value
of ri. Hence we will denote it as simply C
(1)
c,g` . Further, note
that C(1)c,g` depends on the PO policy pair (pi1, pi2), but for
simplicity we have not shown this dependence in the notation
for C(1)c,g` .
Similarly for F2, when its observation is (`, rj) and when
F1 uses f`, we have
C
(2)
s,f`(rj) = f˜`(−η2rj) + (1− f˜`)E(2)(rj)
C
(2)
c,f` = f˜`c
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
+ (1− f˜`)D(2),
where f˜` =
∑
i:f`(ri)=c
p
(1)
i|` .
Definition 6: We say that f` is the best response vector
of F1 against the strategy vector g` played by F2, denoted
f` = BR1(g`), if f`(ri) = s iff C
(1)
s,g`(ri) ≤ C(1)c,g` . Note that
such an f` is unique. Similarly, g` is the (unique) best response
against f` if, g`(rj) = s iff C
(2)
s,f`(rj) ≤ C
(2)
c,f` . We denote this
as g` = BR2(f`).
Definition 7: For ` ∈ L, a pair of strategy vectors (f∗` , g∗` )
is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) vector for the game
G(pi1, pi2) iff f∗` = BR1(g∗` ), and g∗` = BR2(f∗` ).
As remarked earlier, it is not immediately clear whether
a NE vector should even exist among the pure strategies
for the game G(pi1, pi2). Our main result in the next section
(Theorem 4) is to provide a positive answer to this. In fact,
we will not only prove the existence of NE vectors but also
provide a method to construct them.
We will end this section with the following theorem which
is similar to Theorem 1-(b), that was used to obtain NEPPs.
This theorem will enable us to construct PO-NEPPs.
Theorem 3: Given a PO policy pair (pi∗1, pi
∗
2), construct
the strategy vector pair {(f∗` , g∗` ) : ` ∈ L} as follows:
f∗` (ri) = pi
∗
1(ri, `) and g
∗
` (rj) = pi
∗
2(`, rj) for all i, j ∈ [n].
Now, suppose for each `, (f∗` , g
∗
` ) is a NE vector for the game
G(pi∗1, pi∗2) such that,
min
{
C
(1)
s,g∗`
(ri), C
(1)
c,g∗`
}
= G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `), and (37)
min
{
C
(2)
s,f∗`
(rj), C
(2)
c,f∗`
}
= G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(`, rj). (38)
Then (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) is a PO-NEPP.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Discussion: If {(f∗` , g∗` )} happens to be a NE vector, then
from Definition 7 it simply follows that the LHS of (37)
(resp. (38)) is simply the cost incurred by F1 (resp. F2) for
playing the action, f∗` (ri) (resp. g
∗
` (rj)), suggested by its NE
vector. Thus, (37) and (38) collective say that the cost-pair
obtained by playing the NE vector (f∗` , g
∗
` ) in the Bayesian
game G(pi∗1, pi∗2), is equal to the cost-pair incurred by the PO
policy pair (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) in the original POSG. Hence, this result
could be thought of as the analogue of Theorem 1-(b) proved
for the completely observable case.
Existence of a NE Vector: We will fix a PO policy pair
(pi∗1, pi
∗
2) that satisfies the inequalities in (33). In this section
we will prove that there exists a NE vector for G(pi∗1, pi∗2).
Before proceeding to the main theorem we need the following
results (Lemma 4 and 5).
Lemma 4: For any ` ∈ L, the best response vector, f`,
against any vector g` of F2 is a threshold vector, i.e., there
exists an Φ` ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n} such that f`(ri) = s iff i > Φ`.
We refer to Φ` as the threshold of f`. Similarly, if g` is the best
response against any vector f` of F1, then g` is a threshold
vector with threshold Ψ`.
Proof: Since ri′ ≤ ri whenever i′ ≤ i, we can write
C
(1)
s,g`(ri′) ≥ C(1)c,g`(ri) (see (35)). Then the proof follows by
recalling Definition 6.
Remark: The above lemma is possible primarily because of
the independence assumption we had imposed at the beginning
of Section VI. Suppose we had worked with the model where,
given only ri, F1’s belief about F2’s observation is simply
the conditional p.m.f. pR1,R2(rj |ri), j ∈ [n], then, as in (34),
we can write the expression for the continuing probability as
g˜`,ri =
∑
j:g`(rj)=c
pR1,R2(rj |ri), (39)
which is now a function of ri. If we replace g˜` in (35) by g˜`,ri
it is not possible to conclude, C(1)s,g`(ri′) ≥ C(1)s,g`(ri) whenever
i′ ≤ i, as required for the proof of the above lemma.
The following is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4:
if (f∗` , g
∗
` ) is a NE vector then f
∗
` and g
∗
` are both threshold
vectors. Thus, we can restrict our search for NE vectors
over the class of all pairs of threshold vectors. Since a
threshold vector f` can be equivalently represented by its
threshold Φ` we can alternatively work with the thresholds.
Thus Φ` ∈ A0 := {0, 1, · · · , n} represents the n + 1
thresholds that F1 can use. Φ` = 0 (respectively, Φ` = n)
represents the threshold vector which, when used byF1, stops
(respectively, continues) for any value of ri when the location
is `. Similarly, we will represent the n + 1 thresholds that
F2 can use by Ψ` ∈ A0. We will write Φ` = BR1(Ψ`)
whenever their corresponding threshold vectors, f` and g`,
respectively, are such that f` = BR1(g`). Similarly, we will
write Ψ` = BR2(Φ`) whenever g` = BR2(f`).
Lemma 5: (1) Let Ψ`,Ψo` ∈ A0 be two thresholds of
F2 such that Ψ` < Ψo` , then the best response of F1 to
these are ordered as, BR1(Ψ`) ≥ BR1(Ψo`). (2) Similarly, if
Φ`,Φ
o
` ∈ A0 are two thresholds of F1 such that Φ` < Φo`
then BR2(Φ`) ≥ BR2(Φo`).
Proof: See Appendix F.
We are now ready to prove the following main theorem.
We will present the complete proof here because the proof
technique will be required in the next section to construct
PO-NEPPs.
Theorem 4: For every ` ∈ L, there exists a NE vector
(f∗` , g
∗
` ) for the game G(pi∗1, pi∗2).
Proof: As mentioned earlier, a consequence of Lemma 4
is that it is sufficient to restrict our search for NE vectors
within the class of all pairs of threshold vectors. Let A0 :=
{Φ` : 0 ≤ Φ` ≤ n} denote the set of all n + 1 thresholds
of F1. Now, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, inductively define the sets Bk
and Ak as follows: Bk =
{
BR2(Φ`) : Φ` ∈ Ak−1
}
and
Ak =
{
BR1(Ψ`) : Ψ` ∈ Bk
}
.
It is easy to check that through this inductive process we
will finally end up with non-empty sets An and Bn such that
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• for each Φ` ∈ An there exists a unique Ψ` ∈ Bn such
that Φ` = BR1(Ψ`), and
• for each Ψ` ∈ Bn there exists a unique Φ` ∈ An such
that Ψ` = BR2(Φ`).
Since best responses are unique, these would also mean that
|An| = |Bn|.
Note that there is nothing special about this inductive
process, in the sense that for any normal form game with
two player, each of whose action set is A0, this inductive
process will still yield sets An and Bn satisfying the above
properties whenever the best responses are unique. However,
it is possible that there exists no pair (Φ`,Ψ`) ∈ An × Bn
such that Φ` = BR1(Ψ`) and Ψ` = BR2(Φ`). For instance,
An = {Φ`,Φ′`}, Bn = {Ψ`,Ψ′`} and BR2(Φ`) = Ψ` and
BR2(Φ
′
`) = Ψ
′
` while BR1(Ψ`) = Φ
′
` and BR1(Ψ
′
`) = Φ`.
This is precisely where Lemma 5 will be useful, due to which
such a situation cannot arise in our case.
Now, arrange the N = |An| (= |Bn|) remaining thresh-
olds in An and Bn as, Φ`,1 < Φ`,2 < · · · < Φ`,N
and Ψ`,1 < Ψ`,2 < · · · < Ψ`,N , respectively. Then
Φ`,1 = BR1(Ψ`,N ), since if not then using Lemma 5 we
can write Φ`,1 < BR1(Ψ`,N ) ≤ BR1(Ψ`,t) for every
t = 1, 2, · · · , N contradicting the fact that Φ`,1 being in An
has to be the best response for some Ψ`,t ∈ Bn. Similarly
Ψ`,N = BR2(Φ`,1), otherwise again from Lemma 5 we obtain
Ψ`,N > BR2(Φ`,1) ≥ BR2(Φ`,t) for every t = 1, 2, · · · , N
leading to a contradiction that Ψ`,N is not the best response
of any Φ`,t ∈ An. Thus the threshold strategy pair (f∗` , g∗` )
corresponding to the threshold pair (Φ`,1,Ψ`,N ) is a NE
vector. By an inductive argument, it can be shown that all
the threshold vector pairs corresponding to the threshold pairs
(Ψ`,t,Ψ`,N−(t−1)), t = 1, 2, · · · , N , are NE vectors.
D. PO-NEPP Construction from NE Vectors
Once we have obtained NE vectors (f∗` , g
∗
` ), for each
` ∈ [m], The procedure for constructing PO-NEPP from NE
vectors is along the same lines as the construction of NEPP
from NE strategies (see Section V-C).
We begin with a pair of cost terms, C = (C
(1)
, C
(2)
), satis-
fying (33). Using the procedure in the proof of Theorem 4, we
obtain, for each ` ∈ L, the NE vector (f∇` , g∇` ) corresponding
to the threshold pair (Φ`,1,Ψ`,N ) (F1 using lowest threshold
while F2 uses the highest). Then we define
G(1)(ri, `) = min
{
C
(1)
s,g∇`
(ri), C
(1)
c,g∇`
}
G(2)(`, rj) = min
{
C
(2)
s,f∇`
(rj), C
(2)
c,f∇`
}
.
Now recall the expressions for the costs C
(1)
and C
(2)
from
(31) and (32). Compute the RHS of these expressions by
replacing G(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (·) and G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(·) by the functions G(1)(·)
and G(2)(·), respectively. Denote the computed sums as
T 1(C) and T 2(C), respectively. Suppose C is such that
C = (T 1(C), T 2(C)) (we inductively iterate to obtain such
a C) then using Theorem 3 we can construct the PO-NEPP,
(pi∇1 , pi
∇
2 ) using (f
∇
` , g
∇
` ) as follows: for each i, j ∈ [n] and
` ∈ L, pi∇1 (ri, `) = f∇` (ri) and pi∇2 (`, rj) = g∇` (rj).
Finally, since the threshold vector (f∆` , g
∆
` ) corresponding
to the threshold pair (Φ`,N ,Ψ`,1) (F1 using highest threshold
while F2 uses the lowest) is also a NE vector, one can
similarly construct the PO-NEPP, (pi∆1 , pi
∆
2 ), using (f
∆
` , g
∆
` ).
VII. COOPERATIVE CASE
It will be interesting to benchmark the best performance that
can be achieved if both forwarders would cooperate with each
other. In this section, we will describe this case and construct
a Pareto optimal performance curve.
We will assume the completely observable case. The defi-
nition of a policy pair (pi1, pi2) and the costs J
(1)
pi1,pi2(x) and
J
(2)
pi1,pi2(x) will remain as in Section V. However, here our
objective is instead to optimize a linear combination of the
two costs. Formally, let γ ∈ (0, 1), then the problem we are
interested in is,
Minimize(pi1,pi2)
(
γJ (1)pi1,pi2(x) + (1− γ)J (2)pi1,pi2(x)
)
. (40)
Let (piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) denote the policy pair which is optimal for the
above problem. Then, using (18) and (19), it is easy to show
that (piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) is also optimal for
Minimize(pi1,pi2)
(
γC(1)pi1,pi2 + (1− γ)C(2)pi1,pi2(x)
)
. (41)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: The policy pair (piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) is Pareto optimal, i.e.,
for any other policy (pi1, pi2),
(1) if C(1)pi1,pi2 < C
(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
then C(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
< C
(2)
pi1,pi2 , and
(2) if C(2)pi1,pi2 < C
(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
then C(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
< C
(1)
pi1,pi2 .
Proof: Available in Appendix G.
Thus, by varying γ ∈ (0, 1), we obtain a Pareto optimal
boundary whose points are (C(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
, C
(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
). Details on how
to obtain (piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) is available in Appendix G.
VIII. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE
GEOGRAPHICAL FORWARDING EXAMPLE
A. One-Hop Study
The one-hop study can be more general, requiring only a
joint p.m.f. pi,j , a location p.m.f. q`, and conditional p.m.f.s
p
(1)
i|` and p
(2)
j|` (for all i, j and `). However, to illustrate the
practicality of our study, we will study the geographical
forwarding example described in Section III.
Recall the packet forwarding scenario illustrated in Fig. 1.
We will fix the locations of F1 and F2 to be v1 = [0, θ2 ] and
v2 = [0,− θ2 ], respectively. Thus, the distance of separation
between the two forwarders is θ meters (m); we will vary θ
and study the performance of the various policies. The range
of each forwarder is d = 80 m. The combined forwarding
region is discretized into a uniform grid where the distance
between the neighboring points is 5 m. Finally, the sink node
is placed at v0 = [1000, 0].
Next, recall the power and reward expressions from (5)
and (6), respectively. We have fixed dref = 5 m, ξ = 2.5,
and a = 0.5. For ΓN0, which is referred to as the re-
ceiver sensitivity, we use a value of 10−9 milliWatts (mW)
(equivalently −90 dBm) specified for the Crossbow TelosB
wireless mote [43]. The maximum transmit power available
at a node is Pmax = 1 mW (equivalently 0 dBm; again from
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Fig. 3. Performance of the various NEPPs and PO-NEPPs are depicted as points in <2 where the first (second) coordinate is the expected cost incurred
by F1 (F2). Fig. (a) corresponds to the case when the distance of separation θ = 0 m. A portion of Fig. (a) is enlarged and shown in Fig. (b). Fig. (c)
corresponds to θ = 10 m.
the Crossbow TelosB data sheet). We allow for four different
channel gain values: 0.4× 10−3, 0.6× 10−3, 0.8× 10−3, and
1×10−3, each occurring with equal probability. Finally, we fix
η1 = η2 = 100 (recall that ηρ is the parameter used to trade-
off between delay and reward (see (2)), ν1 = 1 − ν2 = 0.5
(νρ is the probability that Fρ will win the contention), and the
mean inter-wake-up time τ = 10 milliseconds (ms).
We first set θ = 0 m (recall that θ is the distance
between the two forwarders) and, in Fig. 3(a), depict the
performance of various NEPPs and PO-NEPPs as pair of costs
C = (C(1), C(2)) where C(ρ) is the cost incurred by Fρ
starting from time 0 if the particular NEPP or PO-NEPP is
used. Also shown in Fig. 3(a) is the performance of a simple
policy (the point marked ×; to be describe next) along with
the Pareto optimal boundary (the solid curve). Since, from
Fig. 3(a) it is not easy to distinguish between the various
points, we show a section of Fig. 3(a) as Fig. 3(b). Fig. 3(c)
corresponds to θ = 10 m.
Various Policy Pairs: The description of various points seen
in Fig. 3 is as follows (we will use Csymbol to denote the cost
pair corresponding to the policy symbol):
• F,©,and : performances of the NEPPs that uses the NE
strategies (s, c), (c, s), and the mixed strategy (Γ1,Γ2),
respectively, whenever (ri, rj) ∈ R4(CF), R4(C©),and
R4(C), respectively (recall Fig. 2).
• ∇ and ∆: performances of the PO-NEPPs that are
constructed by choosing, for each ` ∈ L, the thresholds
(Φ`,1,Ψ`,N ) and (Φ`,N ,Ψ`,1), respectively (recall the
proof of Theorem 4).
• ×: performance of a simple policy where each forwarder
Fρ (ρ = 1, 2) chooses s if and only if its reward value
rρ ≥ α(ρ). Such a policy is optimal whenever Fρ is
alone in the system (recall (12) and (15)). Thus, using the
simple policy each forwarder behaves as if the competing
forwarder is not present.
• solid curve: Pareto optimal boundary obtained by
(piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ), γ ∈ (0, 1); recall Section VII.
Observations: From Fig. 3(b) we see that operating at NEPP
F is most favorable for F2 since C(2)F is less than the cost to
F2 at the other two NEPPs, C
(2)
© and C
(2)
 . This is because
whenever (ri, rj) ∈ R4(CF) the joint-action (s, c) played by
F fetches the least cost (of D(2)) possibly by any strategy. In
contrast, F1 incurs highest cost (of −η1ri) possible because
of which NEPP F is least favorable for F1. For a similar
reason, operating at NEPP © is most favorable for F1 while
being least favorable for F2. The NEPP  which chooses
the mixed strategy (Γ1,Γ2) whenever (ri, rj) ∈ R4(C)
helps to achieve a fairer cost to both players, however the
performance at  is slightly farther from the Pareto boundary
when compared with the other two NEPPs.
The performance at the PO-NEPPs, ∇ and ∆, is worse
than at the NEPPs thus exhibiting the loss in performance
due to partial information. The PO-NEPP ∇ which uses the
NE vector corresponding to the lowest-highest best response
pair, (Φ`,1,Ψ`,N ) (for each ` ∈ L), provides lower cost to
F2 than the PO-NEPP ∆. This is because, F1 using a lower
threshold will essentially choose an initial relay, thus leaving
F2 alone in the system which can now accrue a better cost. For
a similar reason, operating at ∆ leads to F1 achieving a lower
cost. Finally, the simple policy × has the worst performance
in comparison with all other points, suggesting that it may
not be wise to be operating using this policy pair. However,
as we increase the value of θ the performance of the simple
policy improves, and interestingly for θ = 10 m (which is
only 12.5% of the forwarders’ range of 80 m) we observe
that the various points are practically indistinguishable (note
that the magnitude of the scales in plots Fig. 3(a) and 3(c) is
the same). We have observed similar trend when η1 = η2 and
a are set to different values.
Key Insight: Thus, based on our numerical work we draw
the following key insight: even for a small distance of sep-
aration between the forwarders, using the simple policy pair
(where each forwarder behaves as if it is alone in the system)
yields little (or, practically, no) loss in performance when
compared with the performance of an NEPP or a PO-NEPP;
however the performance degradation of the simple policy is
significant whenever the forwarders are very close to each
other. These observations are for the case where there are
two forwarders. However, we expect a similar behavior for
the simple policy even if there are more than two forwarders,
i.e., we believe that the simple policy performs well if the
competing forwarders are moderately separated.
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B. End-to-End Study
Finally, in this section we use simulation to provide an
evaluation of the end-to-end performance of local forwarding.
The competitive forwarding policies (i.e., NEPP and PO-
NEPP) are difficult to implement since their structure has to
be evaluated for each forwarding instance along the path of
a packet. However, based on our observations in the previous
section, we study the performance of the simple policy pair.
In our prior work we have already studied the simple policy’s
performance (see [4, Fig. 8] where the simple policy is referred
to as SF), but there the setting was that of the lone packet
model where a single alarm packet is generated which is then
routed to the sink. Here, we will generalize the lone packet
setting by generating multiple packets simultaneously across
the network so that a packet, along its route, might have to
compete with other packets in its vicinity before reaching the
sink.
We first form a network by randomly placing 1000 nodes
in a square region of area 1 Km2. A source node is placed at
[0, 1000] followed by a sink node at the diagonally opposite
corner [1000, 0]. Each node is allowed to asynchronously and
periodically sleep-wake cycle with period T = 100 ms, i.e.,
each node i wakes up and stays ON for a small duration (which
we neglect, given the other time scales) at the periodic instants
Ti + kT , k ≥ 1 where {Ti} are i.i.d. uniform on [0, T ] (recall
the discussion on the sleep-wake process from Section II).
Each node i, assuming an inter-wake-up time of 1/Ni
(where Ni is the average number of nodes in the forwarding
region of node i), obtains αi which is the threshold (on reward)
required to implement the simple policy by node i. The values
of all the other parameters required to compute the threshold,
e.g., Pmax, ξ, etc., remain the same as in our one-hop study.
If there is no relay whose reward value is more than αi (node
i will know of this after waiting for one entire duty-cycling
period T ), node i, at time T , will simply forward the packet to
the relay with the maximum reward (thus, as relays wake-up
the best relay so far, is asked to wait).
The source node generates an alarm packet at time 0.
We introduce competition by generating additional packets
at randomly chosen nodes, randomly in time at the points
of a Poisson process of rate λ. All the packets are destined
for the same sink. While forwarding, if a relay is chosen
simultaneously by more than one forwarder, then randomly
one of them will win the contention and gets the relay to
forward its packet to. We are interested in studying, as a
function of λ, the performance obtained (in terms of end-to-
end delay and the total power expended) in routing the source’s
packet.
In Fig. 4 we have plotted, for different values of λ, the mean
end-to-end delay vs. the mean end-to-end power (averaged
over packets from the source located at (0, 1000)). These
curves are obtained by varying η, the parameter used to trade-
off between delay and reward in the local problem. Each data
point in Fig. 4 is the average of the respective quantities over
100 alarm packets generated by the source node. Also shown
in the figure is the performance curve corresponding to the
“lone packet case” where no additional packets are generated.
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Fig. 4. End-to-end performance (average power vs. average delay) of the
simple policy as the competing packet rate λ in the network is increased.
Hence the lone packet curve is analogous to the SF policy’s
performance curves in [4, Fig. 8].
Observe that, as we increase λ we obtain a degradation
in performance, i.e., increased delay and power compared
with the lone packet case. This is because, as λ increases,
since there are more packets in the network, there is a larger
probability that a forwarding node carrying the source’s packet
has to compete with other packets in the process of acquiring
a relay. Also, as λ increases, at these instances of competition,
the competing nodes tend to be closer together. From the
observations in the previous section, we can conclude that
as λ increases the performance of the simple policy will
progressively degrade. However, the performance degradation
is only marginal when the packet rate λ ≤ 20 packets/sec
while being moderate for λ = 30 packets/sec, thus supporting
the usage of the simple policy for these packet rates. For
higher values of λ (e.g., λ = 40 packets/sec and beyond) the
performance degradation is significant and hence there could
be a benefit in using NEPPs to forward packets for these rates.
Finally, we have only presented simulation results for the
simple policy, since implementing NEPPs or PO-NEPPs for
end-to-end routing has the following difficulties: (1) for a given
pair of neighboring nodes, obtaining NEPPs will require fixed
point iterations, (2) NEPPs are node pair dependent, so that
all possible neighboring node pairs are required to compute
the corresponding NEPPs, since during actual forwarding a
node may be competing with any of its neighbors. Thus, there
is a large complexity involved in implementing NEPPs. In
contrast, the simple policy (being a single threshold based) is
easy to implement. Moreover, for realistic parameter values
corresponding to TelosB wireless mote, we have seen that the
performance of simple policy is good (in comparison with the
lone packet case) for packet rates λ ≤ 30 packets/sec.
IX. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of competitive relay selection when
two forwarders compete for a next-hop relay (or some resource
in general). We first considered the model where complete
information is available to both the forwarders. We formulated
the problem as a stochastic game and proceeded to obtain
solution in terms of Nash equilibrium policy pairs (NEPPs).
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We were able to provide insight into the structure of NEPPs,
which was primarily possible because of our following key
result (Lemma 2): “cost of continuing alone” is less than
the “cost of continuing along with a competing forwarder”.
We next studied a partially observable case for which we
constructed a Bayesian game which is effective played at each
stage. For this Bayesian game, we proved the existence of a
Nash equilibrium strategy within the class of (pure) threshold
vectors (Theorem 4). The proof method of this result enabled
us to construct NEPPs for the partial case. For the geograph-
ical forwarding example, through numerical experiments we
observed that, even for moderate separation between the two
forwarders, the performance of our simple policy is as good as
the performance of any other NEPP/PO-NEPP. In the context
of end-to-end forwarding, through simulations we established
(for the considered setting) that for packet rates less than 30
packets/second, the performance of the simple policy is good
compared with the lone packet case.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For convenience, here in the appendix we will recall the respective Lemma/Theorem statement before providing its proof.
Lemma 1: α(1) is the unique fixed point of β(1)(x) (x ∈ (−∞, rn]) in (13).
Proof: Let us recall the expression of β(1)(x):
β(1)(x) = E
[
max{x,R1}
]
− τ
η1
,
where the expection is w.r.t. the p.m.f. p(1) of R1 (recall that R1 takes values from the set {r1, r2, · · · , rn}).
Let m = max{i ∈ [n] : p(1)i > 0}. For x > rm, note that β(1)(x) = x − τη1 < x. Hence a fixed point, if any, should
lie within (−∞, rm]. Let us restrict β(1)(·) to the domain (−∞, rm]. Then, since β(1)(x) ≤ rm for any x ∈ (−∞, rm], we
have β(1) : (−∞, rm] → (−∞, rm]. We can now proceed to show that β(1)(x) restricted to x ∈ (−∞, rm] is a contraction
mapping, i.e., for any x, x′ ∈ (−∞, rm], we need to show that
‖ β(1)(x)− β(1)(x′) ‖≤ κ ‖ x− x′ ‖ (42)
for some κ < 1. Without loss of generality let x > x′. Then,
‖ β(1)(x)− β(1)(x′) ‖ = β(1)(x)− β(1)(x′)
= E
[
max{x,R1}
]
− E
[
max{x′, R1}
]
=
n∑
i=1
p
(1)
i
(
max{x, ri} −max{x′, ri}
)
∗
=
m∑
i=1
p
(1)
i
(
max{x, ri} −max{x′, ri}
)
o
=
m−1∑
i=1
p
(1)
i
(
max{x, ri} −max{x′, ri}
)
†
≤
m−1∑
i=1
p
(1)
i
(
x− x′
)
= (1− p(1)m ) ‖ x− x′ ‖ .
In the above derivation, ∗ is because p(1)i = 0 for i > m (recall the definition of m); o is because, since x, x′ ≤ rm, we
have
(
max{x, rm} −max{x′, rm}
)
= 0; to obtain † note that,
(
max{x, ri} −max{x′, ri}
)
≤ (x − x′) for any ri. Thus,
β(1)(x), x ∈ (−∞, rm] is a contraction mapping (recall 42) with κ = (1− p(1)m ) < 1 (since p(1)m > 0 from definition). Hence
from the Banach fixed point theorem [38] it follows that there exists a unique fixed point α∗ ∈ (−∞, rm], i.e., α∗ satisfies
α∗ = β(1)(α∗).
Now, suppose we can show that
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t) = min
{
− η1ri,−η1α∗
}
(43)
then, recalling the expression for D(1) from (11), we obtain
α(1) =
D(1)
−η1
= − τ
η1
− 1
η1
∑
i
p
(1)
i J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t)
= E
[
max{α∗, R1}
]
− τ
η1
.
= β(1)(α∗)
= α∗.
Thus, α(1) is the unique fixed point of β(1)(·).
To show (43), we proceed as follows. Let J0(ri) = 0 for all ri, and for k ≥ 1 define Jk(ri) inductively as
Jk(ri) = min
{
− η1ri, τ + E
[
Jk−1(R1)
]}
. (44)
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Since our problem with one player is equivalent to the optimal stopping problem studied in [39], the above iterations converge
to the optimal cost, i.e., limk→∞ Jk(ri) = J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t). Now, defining α1 = − τη1 , J1(ri) can be written as J1(ri) =
min{−η1ri,−η1α1}. Proceeding further we can write,
J2(ri) = min
{
− η1ri, τ + E
[
J1(R1)
]}
= min
{
− η1ri, τ + E
[
min{−η1α1,−η1R}
]}
= min
{
− η1ri,−η1β(1)(α1)
}
= min
{
− η1ri,−η1α2
}
where α2 = β(1)(α1). Similarly it can be shown that, if Jk−1(ri) = min
{
− η1ri,−η1αk−1
}
, then
Jk(ri) = min
{
− η1ri,−η1αk
}
(45)
where αk = β(1)(αk−1). Thus αk → α∗. Finally, in the above expression taking the limit as k →∞ on both sides, and using
Jk(ri)→ J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, t) and αk → α
∗, we obtain the desired result.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Theorem 1: Given a policy pair, (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2), construct the static game given in Table 5. Then the following statements are
c s
c C(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
, C
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
D(1),−η2rj
s −η1ri, D(2) E(1)(ri), E(2)(rj)
TABLE 5
STATIC STAGE GAME.
equivalent:
(a) (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is an NEPP.
(b) For any x = (ri, rj), (pi∗1(x), pi
∗
2(x)) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy for the game in Table 5. Further, the expected
cost pair at this NE strategy is, (J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x), J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x)).
Proof of (a) =⇒ (b): Suppose (a) is true, i.e., (pi∗1 , pi∗2) is an NEPP. Then, pi∗1 is the best response policy of F1 against
the policy pi∗2 of F2. Hence pi
∗
1 is optimal for the MDP problem, denoted MDP1(pi
∗
2), which is obtained by fixing the policy
pi∗2 of F2 (note that MDP1(pi
∗
2) is a time homogeneous MDP since pi
∗
2 is stationary; recall Definition 1). Since (1) the states
of the form (t, rj) are absorbing and cost free for F1, and (2) the policy of F1 which never stops incurs infinite cost to F1, it
follows that MDP1(pi∗2) is an optimal stopping problem [39]. Hence, J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x), x = (ri, rj) satisfies the following Bellman
equation,
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) = min
{
Cs(x), Cc(x)
}
= min
{
pi∗2(x, c)(−η1ri) + pi∗2(x, s)E(1)(ri),
pi∗2(x, c)C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
+ pi∗2(x, s)D
(1)
}
, (46)
where pi∗2(x, c) (resp. pi∗2(x, s)) is the probability that F2 will choose action c (resp. s) when the state is x. The two terms
in the min-expression above (denoted Cs(x) and Cc(x)) are the expected cost to F1 for taking actions s and c, respectively.
Note that these costs are exactly the expected cost incurred by F1, for playing actions s and c, respectively, in the static game
in Table 4, when the strategy of F2 is pi∗2(x). Now pi
∗
1 , being optimal for MDP1(pi
∗
2), chooses action pi
∗
1(x) ∈ ∆({s, c})
whichever gives a minimum cost or can randomize between the two if both the costs are equal. Hence, it follows from the
structure of (46) that pi∗1(x) is the best response against pi
∗
2(x) for the game in Table 4. Further the cost to F1 for playing
pi∗1(x), from Table 4, is min{Cs(x), Cc(x)} = J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x).
Similarly, by writing the Bellman equation corresponding to the MDP2(pi∗1) problem (which is obtained by fixing the
policy pi∗1 of F1), we can conclude that pi
∗
2(x) is the best response against pi
∗
1(x) for the game in Table 4, with the cost to
player F2 being J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x).
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Proof of (b) =⇒ (a): Given that the policy (pi∗1 , pi∗2) satisfies the condition in (b), let pi1 be any policy of F1. Then, for any
x = (ri, rj), since (pi∗1(x), pi
∗
2(x)) is a NE strategy for the game in Table 4 with cost to F1 at equilibrium being J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x),
we can write
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) ≤ pi1(x, c)
(
pi∗2(x, c)C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
+ pi∗2(x, s)D
(1)
)
+
pi1(x, s)
(
pi∗2(x, c)(−η1ri) + pi∗2(x, s)E(1)(ri)
)
.
LHS of the above expression is the cost incurred to F1 when the strategy played is (pi1(x), pi∗2(x)) (refer to (46)).
Substituting for D(1), E(1)(ri) and C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
, (from (11), (16) and (18), respectively) in the above expression and then
rearranging, we can write
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) ≤ Expi1,pi∗2
[
g1(X1, (A1,1, A2,1))
]
+ Expi1,pi∗2
[
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(X2)
]
Observe that, J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (·) appears on the RHS of the above expression. Hence, inductively applying the above inequality K
times, we obtain
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) ≤
K∑
k=1
Expi1,pi∗2
[
g1(Xk, (A1,k, A2,k))
]
+ Expi1,pi∗2
[
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(XK+1)
]
Taking limit as K →∞ in the above expression we obtain,
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) ≤ J (1)pi1,pi∗2 (x) + limK→∞E
x
pi1,pi∗2
[
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(XK+1)
]
. (47)
Now, letAt = {(t, t)}∪{(t, rj) : j ∈ [n]}.At is the set of all states, which are entered onceF1 terminates. We will assume that
the policy pair (pi1, pi∗2) is such thatF1 will eventually terminate starting from any state x, i.e., limK→∞ Pxpi1,pi∗2 (XK ∈ At) = 1,
or equivalently, for any x′ /∈ At, limK→∞ Pxpi1,pi∗2 (XK = x′) = 0 (otherwise, with positive probability F1 will continue forever
incurring a delay cost of τ at every stage yielding J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x) = ∞, so that the inequality J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) ≤ J (1)pi1,pi∗2 (x) trivially
holds). Using this along with J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x
o) = 0 for any xo ∈ At, we can write
lim
K→∞
Expi1,pi∗2
[
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(XK+1)
]
= lim
K→∞
( ∑
xo∈At
Pxpi1,pi∗2 (XK+1 = x
o)J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(xo) +
∑
x′ /∈At
Pxpi1,pi∗2 (XK+1 = x
′)J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x
′)
)
∗
=
∑
x′ /∈At
lim
K→∞
(
Pxpi1,pi∗2 (XK+1 = x
′)J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x
′)
)
o
=
∑
x′ /∈At
(
lim
K→∞
Pxpi1,pi∗2 (XK+1 = x
′)
)
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x′)
= 0.
Note that, in ∗ interchanging the limit and summation was possible because we have a finite sum (since our state space is finite).
Also, since we have restricted ourselves to the class of stationary policies (recall Definition 1), J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x
′) is not a function of
the stage index K, which enables us to proceed to o. Finally, using the above in (47) we obtain, J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x) ≤ J
(1)
pi1,pi∗2
(x).
Similarly, for F2 it can be shown that J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) ≤ J (2)pi∗1 ,pi2(x) for any pi2 and x = (ri, rj).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Lemma 2 will be an immediate consequence of the following result.
Lemma 7: Given an NEPP (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2), for any (ri, rj) ∈ X we have,
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, t) ≤ J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, rj), (48)
J
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t, rj) ≤ J (2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (ri, rj). (49)
Proof: We will prove only (48); the proof of (49) is along similar lines. Since (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is an NEPP, it follows that the
policy pi∗1 is the best response for F1 against the policy pi
∗
2 of F2, i.e., for any x ∈ X , J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x) = infpi1 J
(1)
pi1,pi∗2
(x). Thus
J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(x) can be regarded as the optimal cost of the MDP problem, MDP1(pi∗2), obtained by fixing the policy pi
∗
2 of F2.
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For simplicity of notation we will denote J (1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (x) as H
∗(x). Thus for the states of the form (ri, t), H∗(ri, t) satisfies the
following Bellman equation (this expression is same as the one in (10))
H∗(ri, t) = min
{
− η1ri, Cc(ri, t)
}
, (50)
where
Cc(ri, t) = τ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ H
∗(ri′ , t) (51)
is the expected cost of continuing, and −η1ri is the cost of stopping.
However, for states of the form (ri, rj) (where F2 is also competing for a relay), the optimality equation is more involved
since the actions of F2 will now affect both costs (stopping and continuing) of F1. Defining  = pi∗2(ri, rj , s) ( is the
probability with which F2 will stop when the state is (ri, rj)), Bellman equation for states of the form (ri, rj) can be written
as
H∗(ri, rj) = min
{
Cs(ri, rj), Cc(ri, rj)
}
, (52)
where Cs(ri, rj) is the expected cost incurred by F1 for stopping when the state is (ri, rj), and Cc(ri, rj) is the expected
cost of continuing.
The expression for Cs(ri, rj) is (recall that νρ, ρ = 1, 2, is the probability that Fρ gets the relay if both forwarders
simultaneously choose to stop),
Cs(ri, rj) = 
(
ν1(−η1ri) + ν2Cc(ri, t)
)
+ (1− )
(
− η1ri
)
. (53)
The first term in the RHS of the above expression is the expected stopping cost incurred by F1 conditioned on the event that
F2 also decides to stop. This can be understood as follows: suppose F2 also decides to stop (probability of which is ), then
w.p. ν1, F1 gets the relay incurring a termination cost of −η1ri, otherwise F2 gets the relay in which case F1 has to continue
alone, the expected cost of which is Cc(ri, t). The remaining term, (1− )(−η1ri), in (53) is the stopping cost incurred to F1
when the action of F2 is to continue (which happens with probability (1− )).
Similarly, the cost incurred by F1 for continuing, Cc(ri, rj), can be written as,
Cc(ri, rj) = 
(
τ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ H
∗(ri′ , t)
)
+ (1− )
(
τ +
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′H
∗(ri′ , rj′)
)
. (54)
Now, returning to (50) and (52), H∗ can be expressed as the fixed point of a mapping T which is, for a function H(·, ·),
given by,
TH(ri, t) = min
{
− η1ri, CHc (ri, t)
}
TH(r1, r2) = min
{
CHs (ri, rj), C
H
c (ri, rj)
}
,
where the expressions for CHc (ri, t), CHs (ri, rj) and CHc (ri, rj) is similar to that of Cc(ri, t), Cs(ri, rj) and Cc(ri, rj) (in
(51) (53) and (54), respectively) with H∗ replaced by the given function H . Inductively define Hk = THk−1 with H0 ≡ 0
(i.e., H0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X ). Since MDP1(pi∗2) is an optimal stopping problem [39] it follows that Hk → H∗ (this is the
value iteration algorithm). Hence, to complete the proof we will show that Hk(ri, t) ≤ Hk(ri, rj) whenever Hk−1(ri, t) ≤
Hk−1(ri, rj).
Suppose, for some k ≥ 1, Hk−1(ri, t) ≤ Hk−1(ri, rj) for all (ri, rj) ∈ X (this holds trivially for k = 1). First consider the
case where, −η1ri ≤ CHk−1c (ri, t) (i.e., it is optimal to stop when the state is (ri, t)).
• Then from (53) we obtain −η1ri ≤ CHk−1s (ri, rj).
• Also, from the induction hypothesis we have∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ Hk−1(ri′ , t) =
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′Hk−1(ri′ , t)
≤
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′Hk−1(ri′ , rj′).
Using the above in (54) and recalling (51) we can write
C
Hk−1
c (ri, rj) ≥ τ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ H
∗(ri′ , t)
= Cc(ri, t)
≥ −η1ri.
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Thus we have,
Hk(ri, t) = min
{
− η1ri, CHk−1c (ri, t)
}
= −η1ri
≤ min
{
C
Hk−1
s (ri, rj), C
Hk−1
c (ri, rj)
}
= Hk(ri, rj).
Similarly for the other case, i.e., when −η1ri > CHc (ri, t), we can show that both the costs, CHk−1s (ri, rj) and CHk−1s (ri, rj),
are less than CHc (ri, t) again yielding Hk(ri, t) ≤ Hk(ri, rj).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: For an NEPP, (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2), the various costs are ordered as follows:
D(1) ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 and D
(2) ≤ C(2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 .
Proof: Recalling the cost expressions of D(1) and C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (from (11) and (18), respectively) we can write,
D(1) = τ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri′ , t)
= τ +
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri′ , t)
∗≤ τ +
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′J
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri′ , rj′)
= C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
,
where ∗ is due to Lemma 7. Similarly, one can show that D(2) ≤ C(2)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 .
APPENDIX D
OBTAINING NE STRATEGIES FOR THE STATIC GAME IN TABLE 4
For convenience, let us first recall the game in Table 4.
c s
c C(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
, C
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
D(1),−η2rj
s −η1ri, D(2) E(1)(ri), E(2)(rj)
TABLE 6
STATIC STAGE GAME.
Since only two actions (namely s and c) are available to each forwarder, a strategy used by F1 can be conveniently
represented by σ1 ∈ [0, 1], where σ1 is the probability that F1 will choose action s. Similarly, σ2 ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
that F2 will choose action s. Given a strategy pair (σ1, σ2) the expected cost (obtained from Table 4) incurred by F1 can be
expressed as
U1(σ1, σ2) = σ1Aσ2 +Bσ2 , (55)
where
Aσ2 = (1− σ2)
(
− η1ri − C(1)
)
+ σ2
(
E(1)(ri)−D(1)
)
(56)
and
Bσ2 = (1− σ2)C(1) + σ2D(1).
Let σ∗1(σ2) denote the set of all best responses of F1 to the strategy σ2 of F2, i.e.,
σ∗1(σ2) = arg min
σ1∈[0,1]
U1(σ1, σ2). (57)
Since U1(σ1, σ2) is linear in σ1 it follows that, σ∗1(σ2) = {0} whenever Aσ2 > 0, σ∗1(σ2) = {1} whenever Aσ2 < 0, and
σ∗1(σ2) = [0, 1] whenever Aσ2 = 0. We make use of these observations in the proof of our next lemma. First for convenience
let us denote the thresholds C
(1)
−η1 and
C(2)
−η2 by ζ
(1) and ζ(2), respectively. Recall that we already have, α(1) = D
(1)
−η1 and
α(2) = D
(2)
−η2 . The inequalities in (20) would (since, −η < 0) imply that ζ(1) ≤ α(1) and ζ(2) ≤ α(2).
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Fig. 5. Plot of best response curves, σ∗1(σ2) and σ
∗
2(σ1), for (ri, rj) in different regions. In each of these figures, the solid red curve is σ
∗
1(σ2) and the
dashed blue curve is σ∗2(σ1). (a) (ri, rj) ∈ R1, (b) (ri, rj) ∈ R5, (c) (ri, rj) ∈ R4, (d) (ri, rj) ∈ R2a, (e) (ri, rj) ∈ R2b, and (f) (ri, rj) ∈ R2c.
Lemma 8: Suppose ν1 ∈ (0, 1) and D(1) < C(1), then
1) If ri < ζ(1) then σ∗1(σ2) = {0} for all σ2 ∈ [0, 1].
2) If ri > α(1) then σ∗1(σ2) = {1} for all σ2 ∈ [0, 1].
3) If ζ(1) ≤ ri ≤ α(1) then defining
Γ2 =
−η1ri − C(1)(
− η1ri − C(1)
)
−
(
E(1)(ri)−D(1)
) (58)
we have: (i) σ∗1(σ2) = {1} for σ2 < Γ2, (ii) σ∗1(σ2) = {0} for σ2 > Γ2, and (iii) σ∗1(Γ2) = [0, 1].
Proof of Part 1: We will show that Aσ2 > 0 for any σ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then the proof follows immediately since, U1(σ1, σ2) =
σ1Aσ2 +Bσ2 , is linear in σ1.
Let us recall the expression for Aσ2 ,
Aσ2 = (1− σ2)
(
− η1ri − C(1)
)
+ σ2
(
C(1)(ri)−D(1)
)
, (59)
where E(1)(ri) = ν1(−η1ri) + ν2D(1) (see (16)). It is already given that ri < C(1)−η1 , or(
− η1ri − C(1)
)
> 0. (60)
Since D(1) < C(1) we also have −η1ri > D(1) which gives E(1)(ri) > D(1) (this is where ν1 ∈ (0, 1) is required), i.e,(
E(1)(ri)−D1
)
> 0. Using this along with inequality (60) we obtain the desired result.
(Proof of Part 2) Similar to the previous part, the proof follows once we show that Aσ2 < 0 for all σ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Since
ri >
D(1)
−η1 and D
(1) < C(1), we obtain
(
−η1ri−C(1)
)
< 0 and
(
E(1)(ri)−D(1)
)
< 0. Using these in (59) we obtain Aσ2 < 0.
(Proof of Part 3) Again, since U1(σ1, σ2) is linear in σ1, we have to show that Aσ2 < 0 whenever σ2 < Γ2, Aσ2 > 0
whenever σ2 > Γ2, and AΓ2 = 0.
Suppose σ2 ∈ [0, 1] is such that σ2 < Γ2 (thus Γ2 ∈ (0, 1]), then recalling the expression for Γ2 we can write,
σ2 <
−η1ri − C(1)(
− η1ri − C(1)
)
−
(
E(1)(ri)−D(1)
) . (61)
It is important to note that, since C
(1)
−η1 ≤ ri ≤ D
(1)
−η1 with D
(1) < C(1) and ν1 ∈ (0, 1), the denominator in the RHS of the
above expression is strictly negative. Thus, rearranging (61) we obtain Aσ2 < 0 so that σ
∗
1(σ2) = {1}.
Similarly, when σ2 ∈ [0, 1] is such that σ2 > Γ2 (in which case Γ2 ∈ [0, 1)), then reversing the inequality in (61) and
rearranging we obtain Aσ2 > 0 so that σ
∗
1(σ2) = {0}.
Finally, substituting for Γ2 in the expression for AΓ2 will yield AΓ2 = 0 implying that any σ1 ∈ [0, 1] is a best response
against the strategy Γ2 played by F2. Hence σ∗1(Γ2) = [0, 1].
Remark: The condition imposed on ν1 and C(1) in the above lemma is only to avoid the less interesting boundary cases.
Also, note that Γ2 is a function of the reward ri to F1. For notational simplicity we do not show ri as an argument of Γ2.
Similarly, for F2 we can define σ∗2(σ1) as the set of all best responses against the strategy σ1 played by F1, and obtain a
result analogous to that in Lemma 8, but with quantities corresponding to F1 replaced by that corresponding to F2, e.g., for
instance, ζ(1) replaced by ζ(2), α(1) by α(2), Γ2 by Γ1 where
Γ1 =
−η2rj − C(2)(
− η2rj − C(2)
)
−
(
E(2)(rj)−D(2)
) . (62)
22
(,)
ζ (1) α(1)
(s,)
(Γ1,Γ2)
ζ (2)
(,s)
(,s)
(s,s)
(s,)
α(2)
rj
ri
R3
R1
R4
R2
R2a
R2c
R2b
R5R3c
R3b
R3a
Fig. 6. Illustration of the various regions along with the NE strategy corresponding to these regions.
Now, for any (ri, rj) the points of intersection between the best response curves σ∗1(σ2) and σ
∗
2(σ1) constitutes the NE
strategies of the game in Table 4. For instance, as shown in Fig. 5(a), when (ri, rj) is such that ri < ζ(1) and rj < ζ(2) (i.e.,
(ri, rj) ∈ R1; see Fig. 6) then the only point of intersection is (0, 0) so that (c, c) is the only NE strategy in this region.
Similarly when (ri, rj) ∈ R5 then (s, s) is the only NE strategy (see Fig. 5(b)). An interesting case is when (ri, rj) ∈ R4
(see Fig. 5(c)) where there are multiple NE strategies, namely, (s, c), (c, s) and the mixed strategy (Γ1,Γ2) (which depends
on the reward pair (ri, rj); see remark following Lemma 8).
The region R2 is written as a union of three disjoint regions, R2a, R2b and R2c. However, as shown in Fig. 5(d) to 5(f), the
best response curves for (ri, rj) in each of these sub-regions intersect at (1, 0). Hence (s, c) is the NE strategy in the union
region R2. Similarly, (c, s) is the NE strategy in region R3 which is also composed of three sub-regions.
R1 =
{
(ri, rj) : ri < ζ
(1), rj < ζ
(2)
}
R2 = R2a ∪R2b ∪R2c where
R2a =
{
(ri, rj) : ζ
(1) ≤ ri ≤ α(1), rj < ζ(2)
}
R2b =
{
(ri, rj) : ri > α
(1), rj < ζ
(2)
}
R2c =
{
(ri, rj) : ri > α
(1), ζ(2) ≤ rj ≤ α(2)
}
R3 = R3a ∪R3b ∪R3c where
R3a =
{
(ri, rj) : ri < ζ
(1), ζ(2) ≤ rj ≤ α(2)
}
R3b =
{
(ri, rj) : ri < ζ
(1), rj > α
(2)
}
R3c =
{
(ri, rj) : ζ
(1) ≤ ri ≤ α(1), rj > α(2)
}
R4 =
{
(ri, rj) : ζ
(1) ≤ ri ≤ α(1), ζ(2) ≤ rj ≤ α(2)
}
R5 =
{
(ri, rj) : ri > α
(1), rj > α
(2)
}
TABLE 7
FORMAL DEFINITION OF VARIOUS REGIONS DEPICTED IN FIG. 6.
We have thus identified a partition of the set {(ri, rj) : i, j ∈ [n]} into five regions such that the set of NE strategies
corresponding to each region are different. These regions along with the corresponding NE strategies are depicted in Fig. 6. A
formal definition of the various regions is available in Table 7. Note that, these regions depend on the cost pairC = (C(1), C(2));
for simplicity we have not shown this explicitly in Fig. 6 and in Table 7.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Theorem 3: Given a PO policy pair (pi∗1, pi
∗
2), construct a strategy vector pair {(f∗` , g∗` ) : ` ∈ L} as follows: f∗` (ri) = pi∗1(ri, `)
and g∗` (rj) = pi
∗
2(`, rj) for all i, j ∈ [n]. Now, suppose for each `, (f∗` , g∗` ) is a NE vector for G(pi∗1, pi∗2) such that,
min
{
C
(1)
s,g∗`
(ri), C
(1)
c,g∗`
}
= G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `), and
min
{
C
(2)
s,f∗`
(rj), C
(2)
c,f∗`
}
= G
(2)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(`, rj).
Then (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) is a PO-NEPP.
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Proof: Given the policy pair (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) as in the hypothesis, let pi1 be any PO policy. We will show that G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `) ≤
G
(1)
pi1,pi∗2
(ri, `); the proof of, G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `) ≤ G(1)pi∗1 ,pi2(ri, `) for any pi2, is along similar lines.
Since f∗` = BR1(g
∗
` ), for the Bayesian game G(pi∗1, pi∗2), the expected cost incurred to F1 when its observation is (ri, `) is
min
{
C
(1)
s,g∗`
(ri), C
(1)
c,g∗`
}
. Hence, using (37) we can write
G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `) ≤ C(1)pi1(ri,`),g∗` (ri)
= E(ri,`)pi1,pi∗2
[
g1(X1, (A1,1, A2,1))
]
+ E(ri,`)pi1,pi∗2
[
G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(O1,2)
]
.
Applying the above inequality K times we obtain
G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `) ≤
K∑
k=1
E(ri,`)pi1,pi∗2
[
g1(Xk, (A1,k, A2,k))
]
+ E(ri,`)pi1,pi∗2
[
G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(O1,K+1)
]
. (63)
Again, as in the proof of Theorem 1 Part-(b), we will assume that the PO policy pair (pi1, pi∗2) is such that using this policy
pair F1 will eventually terminate starting from any observation o1, i.e.,
lim
K→∞
Po1pi1,pi∗2 (O1,K = t) = 1. (64)
Hence we have
lim
K→∞
E(ri,`)pi1,pi∗2
[
G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(O1,K+1)
]
= G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(t)
= 0.
Using the above and recalling (28) while taking limK→∞ in (63) we obtain G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `) ≤ G(1)pi1,pi∗2 (ri, `).
Finally, suppose the PO policy pair (pi1, pi∗2) does not satisfy (64), then there is a positive probability that F1 will continue
forever yielding G(1)pi1,pi∗2 (ri, `) =∞. Thus for this case, G
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
(ri, `) ≤ G(1)pi1,pi∗2 (ri, `), trivially holds.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Lemma 5: (1) Let Ψ`,Ψo` ∈ A0 be two thresholds of F2 such that Ψ` < Ψo` , then the best response of F1 to these
are ordered as, BR1(Ψ`) ≥ BR1(Ψo`). (2) Similarly, if Φ`,Φo` ∈ A0 are two thresholds of F1 such that Φ` < Φo` then
BR2(Φ`) ≥ BR2(Φo`).
Proof: For convenience, first let us recall the expressions of the costs C(1)s,g`(ri) and C
(1)
c,g` from (35) and (36) (since the
given PO policy pair is (pi∗1, pi
∗
2), these costs correspond to the Bayesian game G(pi∗1, pi∗2)):
C
(1)
s,g`(ri) = g˜`(−η1ri) + (1− g˜`)E(1)(ri) (65)
C
(1)
c,g` = g˜`C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
+ (1− g˜`)D(1). (66)
Also, recall from (33) that the cost of continuing alone is less than the cost of continuing along with the competing forwarder,
i.e.,
D(1) ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 (67)
We will only prove Part-(1); the proof of Part-(2) is similar. Let g` and go` be the threshold vectors ofF2 whose corresponding
thresholds are Ψ` and Ψo` , respectively. Given that Ψ` < Ψ
o
` , to prove BR1(Ψ`) ≥ BR1(Ψo`) it is sufficient to show that, for
any ri, C
(1)
s,g`(ri) ≤ C(1)c,g` implies C(1)s,go` (ri) ≤ C
(1)
c,go`
.
Let us begin with an ri such that C
(1)
s,g`(ri) ≤ C(1)c,g` , or alternatively, (recall (65) and (66)) ri is such that,
g˜`(−η1ri) + (1− g˜`)E(1)(ri) ≤ g˜`C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 + (1− g˜`)D
(1).
Substituting E(1)(ri) = ν1(−η1ri) + ν2D(1) in the above expression, and then simplifying we obtain,
−η1ri ≤
g˜`C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
+ (1− g˜`)ν1D(1)
g˜` + (1− g˜`)ν1
Thus −η1ri, being less than the convex combination of the costs C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 and D(1), is less than both of these. Further since
D(1) ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 , there are only two cases which are possible: −η1ri < D(1) ≤ C
(1)
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
, and D(1) ≤ −η1ri ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 . We will
consider these two cases separately below.
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Case-1: Suppose −η1ri < D(1) ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 , then
E(1)(ri) = ν1(−η1ri) + ν2D(1)
≤ D(1).
Using the above two inequalities in the expression of C(1)s,go` (ri), and then comparing with C
(1)
c,go`
we obtain C(1)s,go` (ri) ≤ C
(1)
c,go`
.
Case-2: Suppose D(1) ≤ −η1ri ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 . Then we have E(1)(ri) ≥ D(1). Define κ(p) for p ∈ [0, 1] as,
κ(p) = p
(
− η1ri − E(1)(ri)− C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 +D
(1)
)
+
(
E(1)(ri)−D(1)
)
. (68)
Since −η1ri ≤ C(1)pi∗1 ,pi∗2 and E(1)(ri) ≥ D(1) we have, κ(p) is decreasing in p. Hence we can write κ(g˜o` ) ≤ κ(g˜`) because,
with Ψ` < Ψo` we have,
g˜` =
Ψ∑`
j=1
p
(2)
j|` ≤
Ψo∑`
j=1
p
(2)
j|` = g˜
o
` . (69)
Finally, rearranging the terms in (68) one can obtain,
C
(1)
s,go`
(ri)− C(1)c,go` = κ(g˜
o
` )
≤ κ(g˜`)
= C
(1)
s,g`(ri)− C(1)c,g`
∗≤ 0,
where ∗ is because we started with an ri such that, C(1)s,g`(ri) ≤ C(1)c,g` .
APPENDIX G
OBTAINING COOPERATIVE OPTIMAL POLICY PAIR
We will first prove Lemma 6.
Lemma 6: The policy pair (piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) is Pareto optimal, i.e., for any other policy (pi1, pi2),
(1) if C(1)pi1,pi2 < C
(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
then C(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
< C
(2)
pi1,pi2 , and
(2) if C(2)pi1,pi2 < C
(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
then C(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
< C
(1)
pi1,pi2 .
Proof: We will prove Part-(1); the proof of Part-(2) is similar. Since (piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) is optimal for the problem in (40) we can
write, for any policy pair (pi1, pi2),
γC
(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
+ (1− γ)C(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
≤ γC(1)pi1,pi2 + (1− γ)C(2)pi1,pi2 ,
rewriting which we obtain
C
(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
≤ γ
1− γ
(
C(1)pi1,pi2 − C(1)piγ1 ,piγ2
)
+ C(2)pi1,pi2 .
Now, if C(1)pi1,pi2 < C
(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
then from the above expression we have C(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
< C
(2)
pi1,pi2 .
We now proceed to obtain (C(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
, C
(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
) by formulating the problem in (40) as an MDP. The state space, action space
and the state transitions remain same as in Section V. However the one-step costs have to be appropriately modified to take
into account the multiplier γ. Without writing down all the details we will proceed to the Bellman equation. The one-step
costs will be evident from these.
For states of the form (ri, t)
J∗(ri, t) = min
{
− γη1ri, γτ +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ J
∗(r′i, t)
}
. (70)
The first term in the min expression above corresponds to the cost of the joint-action (s, s) or (s, c) (since F2 has terminated,
its action is irrelavent), and the second term is the expected cost of choosing (c, s) (or (c, c)). Similarly, when the state is
(t, rj) we can write
J∗(t, rj) = min
{
− (1− γ)η2rj , (1− γ)τ +
∑
j′
p
(2)
j′ J
∗(t, r′j)
}
. (71)
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The more interesting case is when both forwarders are still competing, i.e., when the state is of the form (ri, rj), where the
optimality equation is
J∗(ri, rj) = min
{
Cs,c, Cc,s, Cs,s, Cc,c
}
; (72)
Ca1,a2 is the expected cost (one-step + future cost-to-go) of choosing the joint-action (a1, a2). When the joint-action chosen
is (s, c), since F1 stops and F2 continues the one-step cost is
(
− γη1ri + (1 − γ)τ
)
. The subsequent state is of the form
(t, rj′) w.p. p
(2)
j′ . Hence the expression for Cs,c can be written as
Cs,c = −γη1ri + (1− γ)τ +
∑
j′
p
(2)
j′ J
∗(t, rj′). (73)
Similarly Cc,s can be written as
Cc,s = γτ − (1− γ)η2rj +
∑
i′
p
(1)
i′ J
∗(ri′ , t). (74)
When both forwarders decide to stop then w.p. ν1, F1 gets the relay in which case the cost incurred is Cs,c; otherwise, w.p.
ν2, F2 get the relay and the cost incurred is Cc,s. Hence
Cs,s = ν1Cs,c + ν2Cc,s. (75)
Finally, when both forwarders continue the one-step cost is simply
(
γτ + (1 − γ)τ
)
= τ and the subsequent state is still
of the form (ri′ , rj′). Thus we can write
Cc,c = τ +
∑
i′,j′
pi′,j′J
∗(ri′ , rj′). (76)
From (75) note that Cs,s ≥ min{Cs,c, Cc,s} which means that the joint-action (s, s) can never be optimal. Thus, under
cooperation the forwarders never compete for a relay; either F1 will choose the relay, or F2 will choose, or both continue.
Expression (72) can therefore be simplified as
J∗(ri, rj) = min
{
Cs,c, Cc,s, Cc,c
}
. (77)
One can perform value iteration to solve for J∗ in (70), (71) and (77). Given J∗ it is easy to obtain the optimal policy
(piγ1 , pi
γ
2 ) (simply choose the joint-action that minimizes the RHS of these expressions, breaking ties arbitrarily) and then the
cost pair, (C(1)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
, C
(2)
piγ1 ,pi
γ
2
).
